Air Crash Daily | Turkish Airlines Flight 981 Aftermath Footage(s) @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded March 2023 | Updated October 2024, 1 hour ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CpU9PMVucA2/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=

𝗧𝘂𝗿𝗸𝗶𝘀𝗵 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟵𝟴𝟭 was a scheduled flight from Istanbul to London with an intermediate stop in Paris. The flight was being operated by a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (Reg. TC-JAV) on 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵 𝟯, 𝟭𝟵𝟳𝟰.

The plane landed in Paris at 11:02. There were 167 passengers on board, of whom 50 disembarked. The plane was refueled and baggage was loaded onto the plane. The planned turnaround time of 1 hour was delayed by 30 minutes. An additional 216 passengers embarked. Most of the passengers were booked on this flight because of a strike at British Airways. When all preparations were complete the flight received permission to taxi to runway 08 at 12:24. Four minutes later the crew were cleared for departure. The plane took off at approximately 12:30. At 12:34 the North Area Control Centre cleared the flight to FL230.

At 12:40, the noise of decompression was heard on the CVR and the co-pilot said "the fuselage has burst" and the pressurization aural warning sounded. This was caused by the opening and separation of the aft left-hand cargo door. The pressure difference in the cargo bay and passenger cabin, the floor above the cargo door partly collapsed. Two occupied tripe seat units were ejected from the plane. All the horizontal stabilizer and elevator control cables routed beneath the floor were severely disrupted. 77 seconds after the cargo door gave way, the plane crashed into the trees of Ermenonville Forest. All 346 people aboard were killed.

𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲:
"The accident was the result of the ejection in flight of the aft cargo door on the left-hand side: the sudden depressurization which followed led to the disruption of the floor structure, causing six passengers and parts of the aircraft to be ejected, rendering No.2 engine inoperative and impairing the flight controls (tail surfaces) so that it was impossible for the crew to regain control of the aircraft.
The underlying factor in the sequence of events leading to the accident was the incorrect engagement of the door latching mechanism before take-off. The characteristics of the design of the mechanism made it possible for the vent door to be apparently closed and the cargo door apparently locked when in fact the latches were not fully closed and the lock pins were not in place.
It should be noted, however that a view port was provided so that there could be a visual check of the engagement of the lock pins.
This defective closing of the door resulted from a combination of various factors:
- incomplete application of Service Bulletin 52-37;
- incorrect modifications and adjustments which led, in particular, to insufficient protrusion of the lock pins and to the switching off of the flight deck visual warning light before the door was locked;
- the circumstances of the closure of the door during the stop at Orly, and, in particular, the absence of any visual inspection, through the viewport to verify that the lock pins were effectively engaged, although at the time of the accident inspection was rendered difficult by the inadequate diameter of the view port.

Finally, although there was apparent redundancy of the flight control systems, the fact that the pressure relief vents between the cargo compartment and the passenger cabin were inadequate and that all the flight control cables were routed beneath the floor placed the aircraft in grave danger in the case of any sudden depressurization causing substantial damage to that part of the structure.

All these risks had already become evident, nineteen months earlier, at the time of the Windsor accident, but no efficacious corrective action had followed."