Air Crash Daily | SCAT Airlines Flight 760 CVR Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded January 2023 | Updated October 2024, 3 hours ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CoAEweYP3_h/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=

𝗦𝗖𝗔𝗧 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟳𝟲𝟬 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Kokshetau to Almaty. The flight was being operated by a Bombardier CRJ-200ER (Reg. UP-CJ006) on 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟵, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯.

The plane departed Kokshetau at 11:19 local time. At 12:00 the flight contacted Almaty Control and received the current weather conditions which showed a limited visibility for runway 23R of 200 meters. At 12:40 the flight was cleared to descend to FL80. At 12:57 the flight was then cleared down to 1,600 meters. When turning to finals the runway visual range (RVR) for the first, mid and last part of runway 23R was reported as 275-250-225 meters in freezing fog with a vertical visibility of 40 meters. With continuing visibility updates the flight crew kept descending until it was clear that a landing was impossible given the lack of visual contact with the ground. A missed approach was initiated at 13:10 from a height of 180 meters.

The autopilot was disconnected and the TO/GA button was pushed. Engine power increased and the flaps were raised to 8°. In the 4 seconds after pressing to TO/GA button there were no control inputs. Then the captain pushed the control column forward. The EGPWS warning sounded as the pitch changed to -9. The observer pilot tried to draw attention on the EGPWS warning but there was no response on the controls by the flight crew. Pitch angle further increased to -16° and vertical speed was -20 to -30 m/sec. The plane impacted the ground at high speed and a -20° pitch angle.

𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻 (𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗥𝘂𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗮𝗻):
The accident with aircraft CRJ-200 UP-CJ006 occurred during the execution of a go-around, in instrument meteorological conditions, without the possibility of visual contact with ground reference points (vertical visibility in the fog did not exceed 40 m), the necessity of which was caused by the mismatch between the actual weather conditions and the minimum conditions for which the crew was certified to land. As a result, the deflection of the elevator towards a dive of the aircraft caused a descent and collision with the ground. It was not possible to uniquely identify the causes of the aircraft's transfer to a dive from the available data. The Commission did not find evidence of failures of aviation equipment, as well as external to the aircraft (icing, wind shear, wake turbulence) when trying to perform a go-around.
The most likely factors that led to the accident, were:
- partial loss performance of the pilot in command, which at the time of aircraft impact with the ground was not in a working position;
- the lack of CRM levels in the crew, and violation of the Fly-Navigate-Communicate principle, which manifested itself in diverting attention by the co-pilot to conduct external radio communication and lack of control of the flight instrument parameters;
- the lack of response to the EGPWS and the actions required;
- the impact somatographic illusions of perception of the pitch angle (a nose-up illusion);
- increased emotional stress by the crew members associated with the unjustified expectations of improved weather conditions at the time of landing;
- failure to comply with the requirements for health examination of flight personnel, which led to the pilot in command flying without the rehabilitation period and without assessment of his health status after undergoing surgery.