Air Crash Daily | Tatarstan Airlines Flight 363 ATC Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded December 2023 | Updated October 2024, 3 hours ago.
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Source(s): https://www.ntv.ru/video/649600/
youtu.be/6VFrbCuQpIA?si=uvJCR1tVKGEMW2gq (Credit: @Confidential CVR / ATC audio recordings)

Accident Description: instagram.com/p/ClENUUOvUTR/?igshid=MmU2YjMzNjRlOQ==

𝗧𝗮𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟯𝟲𝟯 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Moscow to Kazan, operated by a Boeing 737-500 (Reg. VQ-BBN) on 𝗡𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟭𝟳, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯.

The plane departed Moscow at 18:20 local time. En route the crew noted that their navigation system's map was displaced. During the descent towards Kazan did not ask for vectors from ATC and continued their approach, which was flown 4 km to the north of the published approach procedure due to the map displacement issue. After turning to final for runway 29 the plane was not able to capture the localizer. The pilots programmed a heading of 250° in the Heading Select mode of the autopilot and hurriedly configured the plane for landing. The approach was unstabilized and as the plane turned towards runway heading the co-pilot noticed the PAPI lights and saw they were too high. He then initiated a go around.

The use of the TO/GA switch caused the autopilot to be switched off. The flaps were raised to 15°, but no manual control inputs were made. Indicated airspeed began to decrease, the stabilizer automatically trimmed nose down. With the pitch angle exceeding 25° the crew began using the control column to reduce the pitch angle. Due to nose down input by the captain and trim system, the pitch angle decreased quickly. Vertical loads decreased to 0,5 g as the plane reached a maximum altitude of 2,300 feet. The plane then descended at a rate of more than 5,000 ft/min. 45 seconds after initiating the go around the plane impacted the ground about 1,850 meters past the runway 29 threshold.

𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲 (𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗥𝘂𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗮𝗻):
The cause of the crash Boeing 737-500 VQ-BBN were systemic deficiencies in the identification of hazards and risk control, as well as a non-functional safety management system in the airline and the lack of control over the level of training of the crew members from the aviation authorities at all levels (Tatar MTU BT, Federal Air Transport Agency), which led to the admission of an unprepared flight crew.
When the missed approach was executed the crew did not recognize the fact that the autopilot was off and the aircraft pitched up to a complex spatial position (Nose up Upset). The PIC's (pilot flying) lack of flying skills in complex spatial positions (Upset Recovery) led to the creation of a large negative overload, loss of spatial orientation and transfer of the aircraft into a steep dive (pitch down to 75°) until the impact with the ground.
The need for a go-around was caused by the position of the aircraft relative to the runway, which was the result of "a map shift" effect (Map shift, an error in the determination of the aircraft position by onboard systems) by about 4 km, the crew's inability in the circumstances to integrated piloting and maintenance of navigation with the required accuracy, and the lack of active assistance of the air traffic control service under the long-term monitoring of significant deviations from the approach procedure.