Air Crash Daily | Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 Crash Animation @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded January 2023 | Updated October 2024, 1 day ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/Cn16MfQuxLo/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=
๐๐๐ต๐ถ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฐ๐ฌ๐ต was a scheduled international passenger flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa, operated by a Boeing 737-800 (Reg. ET-ANB) on ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฌ.
The plane took off from Beirut's runway 21 at 02:36. After takeoff ATC instructed ET409 to turn right on a heading of 315ยฐ and change frequencies and contact Beirut Control. ET409 acknowledged the clearance and continued a right turn. ATC instructed ET409 to turn left heading 270ยฐ, which was acknowledged. The flight continued the climbing left turn to heading 270ยฐ but did not maintain that heading. The plane continued on a southerly track. Just prior to reaching altitude of 7,700 feet, the stick shaker activated, sounding for a period of 29 seconds.
Meanwhile the plane reached an angle of attack (AOA) of 32ยฐ and began a descent to 6,000 feet. When the stick shaker ceased, the plane began to climb again. At 02:40:56, just prior to reaching 9,000 feet, the stick shaker activated again, sounding for a period of 26 seconds. After reaching 9,000 feet the plane made a sharp left turn and descended rapidly. The maximum registered bank angle was 118ยฐ left and the plane reached a maximum registered speed was 407.5 knots at a G load of 4.412. The plane disappeared from the radar screen and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea at 02:41:30.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
1- The flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control.
2- The flight crew failure to abide by CRM principles of mutual support and calling deviations hindered any timely intervention and correction.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ฎ๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐:
1- The manipulation of the flight controls by the flight crew in an ineffective manner resulted in the aircraft undesired behavior and increased the level of stress of the pilots.
2- The aircraft being out of trim for most of the flight directly increased the workload on the pilot and made his control of the aircraft more demanding.
3- The prevailing weather conditions at night most probably resulted in spatial disorientation to the flight crew and lead to loss of situational awareness.
4- The relative inexperience of the Flight Crew on type combined with their unfamiliarity with the airport contributed, most likely, to increase the Flight Crew workload and stress.
5- The consecutive flying (188 hours in 51 days) on a new type with the absolute minimum rest could have likely resulted in a chronic fatigue affecting the captain's performance.
6- The heavy meal discussed by the crew prior to take-off has affected their quality of sleep prior to that flight.
7- The aircraft 11 bank angle aural warnings, 2 stalls and final spiral dive contributed in the increase of the crew workload and stress level.
8- Symptoms similar to those of a subtle incapacitation have been identified and could have resulted from and/or explain most of the causes mentioned above. However, there is no factual evidence to confirm without any doubt such a cause.
9- The F/O reluctance to intervene did not help in confirming a case of captain's subtle incapacitation and/or to take over control of the aircraft as stipulated in the operator's SOP.
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/Cn16MfQuxLo/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=
๐๐๐ต๐ถ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฐ๐ฌ๐ต was a scheduled international passenger flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa, operated by a Boeing 737-800 (Reg. ET-ANB) on ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ฌ.
The plane took off from Beirut's runway 21 at 02:36. After takeoff ATC instructed ET409 to turn right on a heading of 315ยฐ and change frequencies and contact Beirut Control. ET409 acknowledged the clearance and continued a right turn. ATC instructed ET409 to turn left heading 270ยฐ, which was acknowledged. The flight continued the climbing left turn to heading 270ยฐ but did not maintain that heading. The plane continued on a southerly track. Just prior to reaching altitude of 7,700 feet, the stick shaker activated, sounding for a period of 29 seconds.
Meanwhile the plane reached an angle of attack (AOA) of 32ยฐ and began a descent to 6,000 feet. When the stick shaker ceased, the plane began to climb again. At 02:40:56, just prior to reaching 9,000 feet, the stick shaker activated again, sounding for a period of 26 seconds. After reaching 9,000 feet the plane made a sharp left turn and descended rapidly. The maximum registered bank angle was 118ยฐ left and the plane reached a maximum registered speed was 407.5 knots at a G load of 4.412. The plane disappeared from the radar screen and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea at 02:41:30.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
1- The flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control.
2- The flight crew failure to abide by CRM principles of mutual support and calling deviations hindered any timely intervention and correction.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ฎ๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐:
1- The manipulation of the flight controls by the flight crew in an ineffective manner resulted in the aircraft undesired behavior and increased the level of stress of the pilots.
2- The aircraft being out of trim for most of the flight directly increased the workload on the pilot and made his control of the aircraft more demanding.
3- The prevailing weather conditions at night most probably resulted in spatial disorientation to the flight crew and lead to loss of situational awareness.
4- The relative inexperience of the Flight Crew on type combined with their unfamiliarity with the airport contributed, most likely, to increase the Flight Crew workload and stress.
5- The consecutive flying (188 hours in 51 days) on a new type with the absolute minimum rest could have likely resulted in a chronic fatigue affecting the captain's performance.
6- The heavy meal discussed by the crew prior to take-off has affected their quality of sleep prior to that flight.
7- The aircraft 11 bank angle aural warnings, 2 stalls and final spiral dive contributed in the increase of the crew workload and stress level.
8- Symptoms similar to those of a subtle incapacitation have been identified and could have resulted from and/or explain most of the causes mentioned above. However, there is no factual evidence to confirm without any doubt such a cause.
9- The F/O reluctance to intervene did not help in confirming a case of captain's subtle incapacitation and/or to take over control of the aircraft as stipulated in the operator's SOP.