Air Crash Daily | Atlas Air Flight 3591 NTSB Animation @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded February 2023 | Updated October 2024, 1 day ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CpAk29lPu7W/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐๐๐น๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฏ๐ฑ๐ต๐ญ was a scheduled domestic cargo flight from Miami to Houston, operated by a Boeing 767-300F (Reg. N1217A) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฏ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ต.
The plane departed Miami at 11:33 local time. Descent towards Houston was commenced at 12:07. About 12:30 the pilots contacted the Houston TRACON arrival controller. About 12:35 the flight was transferred to the Houston TRACON final controller. At 12:38:31, the planeโs go-around mode was activated. Shortly after, when the planeโs indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots, the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the plane pitch increased to about 4ยฐ nose up.
The plane then pitched nose down over the next 18 seconds to about 49ยฐ in response to nose-down elevator deflection. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate. FDR, radar, and ADS-B data indicated that the plane entered a rapid descent on a heading of 270ยฐ, reaching an airspeed of about 430 knots. A security camera video captured the plane in a steep, generally wings-level attitude until it impacted a swamp in Trinity Bay. FDR data indicated that the plane gradually pitched up to about 20ยฐ nose down during the descent.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry's selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer's aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to implement the Pilot Records Database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner."
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CpAk29lPu7W/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐๐๐น๐ฎ๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฏ๐ฑ๐ต๐ญ was a scheduled domestic cargo flight from Miami to Houston, operated by a Boeing 767-300F (Reg. N1217A) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฏ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ญ๐ต.
The plane departed Miami at 11:33 local time. Descent towards Houston was commenced at 12:07. About 12:30 the pilots contacted the Houston TRACON arrival controller. About 12:35 the flight was transferred to the Houston TRACON final controller. At 12:38:31, the planeโs go-around mode was activated. Shortly after, when the planeโs indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots, the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the plane pitch increased to about 4ยฐ nose up.
The plane then pitched nose down over the next 18 seconds to about 49ยฐ in response to nose-down elevator deflection. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate. FDR, radar, and ADS-B data indicated that the plane entered a rapid descent on a heading of 270ยฐ, reaching an airspeed of about 430 knots. A security camera video captured the plane in a steep, generally wings-level attitude until it impacted a swamp in Trinity Bay. FDR data indicated that the plane gradually pitched up to about 20ยฐ nose down during the descent.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry's selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer's aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to implement the Pilot Records Database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner."