Air Crash Daily | British European Airways Flight 609 Aftermath Footage(s) @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded February 2023 | Updated October 2024, 28 minutes ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CoUIk2pPWyZ/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=
๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ต was an international charter flight from Belgrade to Manchester with an stopover in Munich. The flight was being operated by an Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador (Reg. G-ALZU) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฒ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ฑ๐ด.
The plane arrived in Munich at 14:17 in snowy weather. At 15:20 the crew received clearance to taxi to runway 25. At 15:31 the plane started the takeoff roll. An uneven engine tone and fluctuating pressure caused the crew to abandon the takeoff. The plane backtracked and was cleared for a second attempt. This time the no. 1 engine pressure rose, causing the crew to abandon this takeoff attempt as well. The plane taxied back to the tarmac and the crew discussed the problem. It was decided that opening the throttles more slowly, could eliminate the problem of 'boost surging'.
Around 16:00 the plane was again cleared to taxi to and takeoff from runway 25. Accelerating through 85 knots into the takeoff the no. 1 engine surged slightly. The no. 1 engine was throttled down until the surging stopped; power was then applied slowly again. Before reaching V2 (119 knots) the plane entered an area of even slush. The airspeed dropped to about 105 knots, a speed insufficient to become airborne. The plane ran off the runway and crashed through a boundary fence. After crossing a small road, the plane slammed into a house and a tree. The plane skidded another 100 yards until striking a wooden garage containing a truck.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
In 1959 the German Luftfahrt-Bundesamt concluded:
During the stop of almost two hours at Munich, a rough layer of ice formed on the upper surface of the wings as a result of snowfall. This layer of ice considerably impaired the aerodynamic efficiency of the aircraft, had a detrimental effect on the acceleration of the aircraft during the take-off process and increased the required unstick-speed.
Thus, under the conditions obtaining at the time of take-off, the aircraft was not able to attain this speed within the rolling distance available.
The decisive cause of the accident lay in this.
It is not out of the question that, in the final phase of the take-off process, further causes may also have had an effect on the accident.
British tests on the effect of slush on the takeoff process of an aircraft led the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt to decide to re-open the investigation in November 1964.
In August 1966 the Commission arrived at the view that in the runway conditions obtaining at Munich-Riem at the time of the accident, the aircraft G-ALZU without ice on the wing upper surfaces could have attained the required unstick speed and would have been bound to have done so. The failure to unstick, and hence the accident, are thus to be attributed to a series of inter-related causal factors viz.:
1. Decrease in the lift coefficient resulting from ice on the wing upper surfaces and a consequent increase in the minimum unstick speed;
2. Increase in drag caused by ice accretion, particularly at the higher angle of incidence during the unstick process;
3. Reduction by slush and spray of the margin of performance of the aircraft and effect of the slush on the trim.
The differing assessments of the situation by the two pilots during the final phase of the take-off to be inferred from Captain Thain's statements resulted in their acting in opposition which probably increased the severity of the accident.
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CoUIk2pPWyZ/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=
๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ต was an international charter flight from Belgrade to Manchester with an stopover in Munich. The flight was being operated by an Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador (Reg. G-ALZU) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฒ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ฑ๐ด.
The plane arrived in Munich at 14:17 in snowy weather. At 15:20 the crew received clearance to taxi to runway 25. At 15:31 the plane started the takeoff roll. An uneven engine tone and fluctuating pressure caused the crew to abandon the takeoff. The plane backtracked and was cleared for a second attempt. This time the no. 1 engine pressure rose, causing the crew to abandon this takeoff attempt as well. The plane taxied back to the tarmac and the crew discussed the problem. It was decided that opening the throttles more slowly, could eliminate the problem of 'boost surging'.
Around 16:00 the plane was again cleared to taxi to and takeoff from runway 25. Accelerating through 85 knots into the takeoff the no. 1 engine surged slightly. The no. 1 engine was throttled down until the surging stopped; power was then applied slowly again. Before reaching V2 (119 knots) the plane entered an area of even slush. The airspeed dropped to about 105 knots, a speed insufficient to become airborne. The plane ran off the runway and crashed through a boundary fence. After crossing a small road, the plane slammed into a house and a tree. The plane skidded another 100 yards until striking a wooden garage containing a truck.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
In 1959 the German Luftfahrt-Bundesamt concluded:
During the stop of almost two hours at Munich, a rough layer of ice formed on the upper surface of the wings as a result of snowfall. This layer of ice considerably impaired the aerodynamic efficiency of the aircraft, had a detrimental effect on the acceleration of the aircraft during the take-off process and increased the required unstick-speed.
Thus, under the conditions obtaining at the time of take-off, the aircraft was not able to attain this speed within the rolling distance available.
The decisive cause of the accident lay in this.
It is not out of the question that, in the final phase of the take-off process, further causes may also have had an effect on the accident.
British tests on the effect of slush on the takeoff process of an aircraft led the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt to decide to re-open the investigation in November 1964.
In August 1966 the Commission arrived at the view that in the runway conditions obtaining at Munich-Riem at the time of the accident, the aircraft G-ALZU without ice on the wing upper surfaces could have attained the required unstick speed and would have been bound to have done so. The failure to unstick, and hence the accident, are thus to be attributed to a series of inter-related causal factors viz.:
1. Decrease in the lift coefficient resulting from ice on the wing upper surfaces and a consequent increase in the minimum unstick speed;
2. Increase in drag caused by ice accretion, particularly at the higher angle of incidence during the unstick process;
3. Reduction by slush and spray of the margin of performance of the aircraft and effect of the slush on the trim.
The differing assessments of the situation by the two pilots during the final phase of the take-off to be inferred from Captain Thain's statements resulted in their acting in opposition which probably increased the severity of the accident.
