Air Crash Daily | Aeroperรบ Flight 603 CVR Recording (Clearer Version) @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded December 2023 | Updated October 2024, 1 hour ago.
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Source: newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=386924bd6214f3a5a1fb5364871de057&mediatype=video
Full Version: youtu.be/-pWaY4wra3w?si=mi1Ehy7N0WG9bWk1
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CjNl-XOP1Zs/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ฏ was a scheduled international passenger flight from Miami to Santiago with intermediate stops in Quito and Lima. The flight was being operated by a Boeing 757-200 (Reg. N52AW) on ๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ต๐ฒ.
The plane took off from Lima's runway 15 at 00:42 local time for the last leg to Santiago. 5 minutes after takeoff the crew reported problems with their instruments and stated they wanted to return to the airport. During the initial climb, the airspeed and altitude indications were too low. In calm winds, the windshear warning suddenly sounded. The plane climbed to FL130, before a return to Lima was initiated. While returning, the captain's airspeed indications were too high, causing an overspeed warning. At the same time, the co-pilot's airspeed indications were too low, triggering the stick shaker.
The plane kept descending and impacted the water with the left wing and no. 1 engine at a 10ยฐ angle, at a speed of 260 knots. The crew attempted to climb and the plane pulled up to about 200 feet before crashing inverted 22 seconds later. The captain's airspeed indicated 450 knots and altitude 9,500 feet. Investigation results showed that the plane's three static ports on the left side were obstructed by duct tape. The tape had been applied before washing and polishing of the plane prior to the accident flight.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ป๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
ERROR OF THE MAINTENANCE STAFF INCLUDING THE CREW
It can be deduced from the investigation carried out that the maintenance staff did not remove the protective adhesive tape from the static ports. This tape was not detected during the various phases of the aircraft's release to the line mechanic, its transfer to the passenger boarding apron and, lastly, the inspection by the crew responsible for the flight (the walk-around or pre-flight check), which was carried out by the pilot-in-command, [name], according to the mechanic responsible for the aircraft on the day of the accident.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
b.1) PERSONAL ERROR OF THE CREW
The pilot-in-command, Mr [name], made a personal error by not complying with the procedure for GPWS alarms and not noticing the readings of the radio altimeters in order to discard everything which he believed to be fictitious.
b.2) PERSONAL ERROR INCLUDING THE CREW
The co-pilot, Mr DAVID FERNรNDEZ REVOREDO, made a personal error by not being more insistent, assertive and convincing in alerting the pilot-in-command much more emphatically to the ground proximity alarms.
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Source: newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=386924bd6214f3a5a1fb5364871de057&mediatype=video
Full Version: youtu.be/-pWaY4wra3w?si=mi1Ehy7N0WG9bWk1
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CjNl-XOP1Zs/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ฏ was a scheduled international passenger flight from Miami to Santiago with intermediate stops in Quito and Lima. The flight was being operated by a Boeing 757-200 (Reg. N52AW) on ๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ต๐ฒ.
The plane took off from Lima's runway 15 at 00:42 local time for the last leg to Santiago. 5 minutes after takeoff the crew reported problems with their instruments and stated they wanted to return to the airport. During the initial climb, the airspeed and altitude indications were too low. In calm winds, the windshear warning suddenly sounded. The plane climbed to FL130, before a return to Lima was initiated. While returning, the captain's airspeed indications were too high, causing an overspeed warning. At the same time, the co-pilot's airspeed indications were too low, triggering the stick shaker.
The plane kept descending and impacted the water with the left wing and no. 1 engine at a 10ยฐ angle, at a speed of 260 knots. The crew attempted to climb and the plane pulled up to about 200 feet before crashing inverted 22 seconds later. The captain's airspeed indicated 450 knots and altitude 9,500 feet. Investigation results showed that the plane's three static ports on the left side were obstructed by duct tape. The tape had been applied before washing and polishing of the plane prior to the accident flight.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ป๐ฐ๐ถ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
ERROR OF THE MAINTENANCE STAFF INCLUDING THE CREW
It can be deduced from the investigation carried out that the maintenance staff did not remove the protective adhesive tape from the static ports. This tape was not detected during the various phases of the aircraft's release to the line mechanic, its transfer to the passenger boarding apron and, lastly, the inspection by the crew responsible for the flight (the walk-around or pre-flight check), which was carried out by the pilot-in-command, [name], according to the mechanic responsible for the aircraft on the day of the accident.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฏ๐๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐:
b.1) PERSONAL ERROR OF THE CREW
The pilot-in-command, Mr [name], made a personal error by not complying with the procedure for GPWS alarms and not noticing the readings of the radio altimeters in order to discard everything which he believed to be fictitious.
b.2) PERSONAL ERROR INCLUDING THE CREW
The co-pilot, Mr DAVID FERNรNDEZ REVOREDO, made a personal error by not being more insistent, assertive and convincing in alerting the pilot-in-command much more emphatically to the ground proximity alarms.
