Air Crash Daily | Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 ATC Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded February 2023 | Updated October 2024, 3 hours ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CpFt9pqvrFD/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐ง๐๐ฟ๐ธ๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ญ๐ต๐ฑ๐ญ was a scheduled international passenger flight from Istanbul to Amsterdam, operated by a Boeing 737-800 (Reg. TC-JGE) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ต.
The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8,500 feet. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The plane continued and was then directed by ATC towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. While descending through 1,950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one.
When the plane started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the โretard flareโ mode. This caused a reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the plane. These were not recognised until the approach to stick shaker went off at an altitude of 460 feet. 9 seconds after the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the plane had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet. The plane crashed into a field approximately 1 mile north of runway 18R at 09:26 UTC. The plane broke into 3 pieces on impact.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฐ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐:
The Dutch Safety Board has reached the following main conclusion:
During the accident flight, while executing the approach by means of the instrument landing system with the right autopilot engaged, the left radio altimeter system showed an incorrect height of -8 feet on the left primary flight display. This incorrect value of -8 feet resulted in activation of the 'retard flare' mode of the autothrottle, whereby the thrust of both engines was reduced to a minimal value (approach idle) in preparation for the last phase of the landing. Due to the approach heading and altitude provided to the crew by air traffic control, the localizer signal was intercepted at 5.5 NM from the runway threshold with the result that the glide slope had to be intercepted from above. This obscured the fact that the autothrottle had entered the retard flare mode. In addition, it increased the crew's workload. When the aircraft passed 1000 feet height, the approach was not stabilised so the crew should have initiated a go around. The right autopilot (using data from the right radio altimeter) followed the glide slope signal. As the airspeed continued to drop, the aircraft's pitch attitude kept increasing. The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash.
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CpFt9pqvrFD/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
๐ง๐๐ฟ๐ธ๐ถ๐๐ต ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ญ๐ต๐ฑ๐ญ was a scheduled international passenger flight from Istanbul to Amsterdam, operated by a Boeing 737-800 (Reg. TC-JGE) on ๐๐ฒ๐ฏ๐ฟ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ต.
The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8,500 feet. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The plane continued and was then directed by ATC towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. While descending through 1,950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one.
When the plane started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the โretard flareโ mode. This caused a reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the plane. These were not recognised until the approach to stick shaker went off at an altitude of 460 feet. 9 seconds after the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the plane had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet. The plane crashed into a field approximately 1 mile north of runway 18R at 09:26 UTC. The plane broke into 3 pieces on impact.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฐ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐:
The Dutch Safety Board has reached the following main conclusion:
During the accident flight, while executing the approach by means of the instrument landing system with the right autopilot engaged, the left radio altimeter system showed an incorrect height of -8 feet on the left primary flight display. This incorrect value of -8 feet resulted in activation of the 'retard flare' mode of the autothrottle, whereby the thrust of both engines was reduced to a minimal value (approach idle) in preparation for the last phase of the landing. Due to the approach heading and altitude provided to the crew by air traffic control, the localizer signal was intercepted at 5.5 NM from the runway threshold with the result that the glide slope had to be intercepted from above. This obscured the fact that the autothrottle had entered the retard flare mode. In addition, it increased the crew's workload. When the aircraft passed 1000 feet height, the approach was not stabilised so the crew should have initiated a go around. The right autopilot (using data from the right radio altimeter) followed the glide slope signal. As the airspeed continued to drop, the aircraft's pitch attitude kept increasing. The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash.
