Air Crash Daily | Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight 182 ATC Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded December 2023 | Updated October 2024, 15 hours ago.
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Accident Description: instagram.com/p/Ci7EEQsvi-_/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
Credits: @GeNoAviation
๐ฃ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ๐ถ๐ฐ ๐ฆ๐ผ๐๐๐ต๐๐ฒ๐๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ญ๐ด๐ฎ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Sacramento to San Diego with a stopover in San Diego. The flight was being operated by a Boeing 727 (Reg. N533PS) on ๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ณ๐ด.
About 08:16 local time a Gibbs Flite Center Cessna 172 (Reg. N7711G) departed Montgomery Field on an instrument training flight. At 08:34 Flight 182 departed Los Angeles. About 08:57, N7711G ended a second approach and began a climbout to the northeast. At 08:59:50, the Cessna pilot contacted San Diego approach control and stated that he was at 1,500 feet and "northeastbound." At 09:01:47 Flight 182 collided with the Cessna.
Flight 182 was descending and overtaking the Cessna, which was climbing in a wing level attitude. Just before impact, Flight 182 banked to the right slightly, and the Cessna pitched noseup and collided with the right wing of the 727. The Cessna broke up immediately and exploded. Flight 182 began a shallow right turn. Both the bank and pitch angles increased during the descent to about 50ยฐ at impact.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 to comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, including the requirement to inform the controller when visual contact was lost; and the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures in a terminal area environment when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical separation to either aircraft. Contributing to the accident were (1) the failure of the controller to advise Flight 182 of the direction of movement of the Cessna; (2) the failure of the pilot of the Cessna to maintain his assigned heading; and (3) the improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert."
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/Ci7EEQsvi-_/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=
Credits: @GeNoAviation
๐ฃ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ถ๐ณ๐ถ๐ฐ ๐ฆ๐ผ๐๐๐ต๐๐ฒ๐๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ญ๐ด๐ฎ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Sacramento to San Diego with a stopover in San Diego. The flight was being operated by a Boeing 727 (Reg. N533PS) on ๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ฑ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ณ๐ด.
About 08:16 local time a Gibbs Flite Center Cessna 172 (Reg. N7711G) departed Montgomery Field on an instrument training flight. At 08:34 Flight 182 departed Los Angeles. About 08:57, N7711G ended a second approach and began a climbout to the northeast. At 08:59:50, the Cessna pilot contacted San Diego approach control and stated that he was at 1,500 feet and "northeastbound." At 09:01:47 Flight 182 collided with the Cessna.
Flight 182 was descending and overtaking the Cessna, which was climbing in a wing level attitude. Just before impact, Flight 182 banked to the right slightly, and the Cessna pitched noseup and collided with the right wing of the 727. The Cessna broke up immediately and exploded. Flight 182 began a shallow right turn. Both the bank and pitch angles increased during the descent to about 50ยฐ at impact.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 to comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, including the requirement to inform the controller when visual contact was lost; and the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures in a terminal area environment when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical separation to either aircraft. Contributing to the accident were (1) the failure of the controller to advise Flight 182 of the direction of movement of the Cessna; (2) the failure of the pilot of the Cessna to maintain his assigned heading; and (3) the improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert."
