Uploaded October 2025 | Updated September 2026, 7 hours ago
This lawsuit is about immunity - for the judge, for the prosecutor, cop and bailiff. This case is factually intensive, and a full review is not feasible. The service on the defendants is to be completed by October 20, 2025. Chille has already amended the complaint once.
None of this is legal advice, and is for informational and educational purposes. All rights reserved, including California's anti-SLAPP statute. No attorney-client relationship is inferred or expressed.
This lawsuit is about immunity - for the judge, for the prosecutor, cop and bailiff. This case is factually intensive, and a full review is not feasible. The service on the defendants is to be completed by October 20, 2025. Chille has already amended the complaint once.
None of this is legal advice, and is for informational and educational purposes. All rights reserved, including California's anti-SLAPP statute. No attorney-client relationship is inferred or expressed.



![Trial Lawyer Reviews Jose DeCastros Appeal. Will Willson Decision Reverse The Obstruction Charge?
Jose “Chille” DeCastro has a new case to deal with, Willson v. First Judicial District (2024), as it concerns his “obstruction” conviction. Spoiler alert: I would need to review the trial again to gain insight as to whether in light of Willson he would still be convicted on this charge.
Constitutional challenges are very complex. The statute could be so poorly written that nobody can really understand it, or its plain language is ambiguous and vague, or it can be discriminatory in its application, among others.
The case – the first reported decision since the statute was passed in 1911` - has narrowed the focus and reach of this statute to “specific” and not “general” intent. The case further held that it obstruction is limited to physical conduct and “fighting words.” The appellate court essentially admitted that the District Court was understandably in a bind trying to interpret a statute that looks unconstitutional to me, since that’s problem with unconstitutional statutes – you can’t figure them out with any precision. The appellate court stated: “Therefore, we conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether it prohibits speech.” While limiting it to physical conduct and “fighting words,” the appellate court still left open the possibility that non-physical acts and non-fighting words could still trigger a conviction. The appellate court canvassed other states in an aid to interpret it without invalidating it. There is no legislative history for the appellate court to consider when the legislature passed this statute.
The appellate court left in important exceptions: “Strictly speaking, the spoken word may slow, hamper, prevent, or impede a public officer from performing their duties….[Citations]. (stating “the spoken word can be just as effective in impeding an officer in the discharge of his duty as if the orater [sic] had grappled with the officer”); see also Scott, 131 Nev. at 1022, 363 P.3d at 1164 (stating a pedestrian may hinder or delay a deputy sheriff by asking the deputy for directions while the deputy is directing traffic at an intersection). As such, NRS 197.190 may reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer. And, “The specific intent requirement also may not, in itself, provide sufficient guidance to law enforcement in the statutes application. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 469 n.18 (stating an intent requirement would not “cabin the excessive discretion the ordinance provides to officers”); Scott, 131 Nev. at 1027 n.6, 363 P.3d at 1168 n.6 (Hardesty, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating “there is little doubt” an obstruction ordinance would survive constitutional scrutiny if interpreted to require both specific intent and physical conduct or fighting words)” And this: “We note that NRS 197.190 does not require the use of force or violence, and that a persons action (e.g., blocking the path of an officer) or inaction (e.g., refusing to obey a lawful order) may constitute physical conduct that hinders, delays, or obstructs an officer. See State v. Hudson, 784 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that “nonaggressive behavior” may hinder, delay, or obstruct an officer just as “assaultive conduct”); see also Christopher Hall, Annotation, What Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting Officer, in Absence of Actual Force, 66 A.L.R.5th 397 (1999) (collecting cases where courts have determined what constitutes obstructing an officer in the absence of actual force). Of course, whether a persons physical conduct actually hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact in a given case.”
This will require a review of the trial again to see if anything Chille did or said still constitutes obstruction. That will be a video for a later date.
None of this legal advice, nor can it be relied upon. This is the perspective from a California lawyer, and who is commenting on a public issue. All rights reserved, including anti-SLAPP defenses. No attorney client relationship is formed or implied. This information may not be relied upon. Seek advice from a locally licensed attorney. Trial Lawyer Reviews Jose DeCastros Appeal. Will Willson Decision Reverse The Obstruction Charge?](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/54AT_RMBFMk/mqdefault.jpg)






