Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
A book symposium organised by the Quain Centre of Jurisprudence
Speaker: Dr Conor Crummey, Assistant Professor in Law (Maynooth University, School of Law and Criminology)
Commentators: Prof Trevor Allan (Cambridge University), Dr Stuart Lakin (University of Reading), Ana Diaz Azcunage (University of Oxford)
Chair: Prof George Letsas, Professor of Philosophy of Law (UCL Laws)
About the Book Symposium:
It is a well-known tenet of public law that judges must interpret a statute consistently with common law rights and principles, unless that statute uses clear and express language to license the violation of such rights and principles. This is the ‘principle of legality’. But which rights and principles trigger the principle of legality? How ‘clear and express’ must statutory language be to license interference with common law rights? Does this method of interpretation apply only to statutes, or should it apply to interpretation of the scope of prerogative powers as well? What does the method of interpretation tell us about the relationship between the rule of law and parliamentary supremacy? This book develops a philosophical theory of the principle of legality to help answer these questions.
This book challenges the prevailing notion that the principle of legality is a presumption about the intentions of the legislature. Drawing on debates in the philosophy of language and general jurisprudence, the book shows that these theories fail to account for the principle of legality in a satisfactory way. The book then deploys a non-positivist theory of general jurisprudence to show that judges invoking the principle of legality are engaging in a complex process of moral reasoning.
The Principle of Legality: A Moral Theory (OUP, 2025)
A book symposium organised by the Quain Centre of Jurisprudence
Speaker: Dr Conor Crummey, Assistant Professor in Law (Maynooth University, School of Law and Criminology)
Commentators: Prof Trevor Allan (Cambridge University), Dr Stuart Lakin (University of Reading), Ana Diaz Azcunage (University of Oxford)
Chair: Prof George Letsas, Professor of Philosophy of Law (UCL Laws)
About the Book Symposium:
It is a well-known tenet of public law that judges must interpret a statute consistently with common law rights and principles, unless that statute uses clear and express language to license the violation of such rights and principles. This is the ‘principle of legality’. But which rights and principles trigger the principle of legality? How ‘clear and express’ must statutory language be to license interference with common law rights? Does this method of interpretation apply only to statutes, or should it apply to interpretation of the scope of prerogative powers as well? What does the method of interpretation tell us about the relationship between the rule of law and parliamentary supremacy? This book develops a philosophical theory of the principle of legality to help answer these questions.
This book challenges the prevailing notion that the principle of legality is a presumption about the intentions of the legislature. Drawing on debates in the philosophy of language and general jurisprudence, the book shows that these theories fail to account for the principle of legality in a satisfactory way. The book then deploys a non-positivist theory of general jurisprudence to show that judges invoking the principle of legality are engaging in a complex process of moral reasoning.
The Principle of Legality: A Moral Theory (OUP, 2025)










