Air Crash Daily | American Eagle Flight 4184 ATC Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded August 2024 | Updated October 2024, 1 hour ago.
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CkYAUhoBhr7/?igsh=NWlka2o1bHR2bGdm
๐๐บ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ฎ๐ด๐น๐ฒ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฐ๐ญ๐ด๐ฐ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Indianapolis to Chicago, operated by an ATR 72 (Reg. N401AM) on ๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฏ๐ญ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ต๐ฐ.
The plane departed Indianapolis at 14:55. The plane climbed to an enroute altitude of 16,300 feet. At 15:13, the flight began the descent to 10,000 feet. At 15:18, shortly after the plane leveled off at 10,000 feet, the crew received a clearance to enter a holding pattern near the LUCIT intersection and they were told to expect further clearance at 15:45, which was revised to 16:00 at 15:38. At 15:56, the controller contacted the flight and instructed the flight crew to descend to 8,000 feet. At 15:57:33, as the plane was descending through 9,130 feet, the AOA increased through 5ยฐ, and the ailerons began deflecting to a right-wing-down position.
About ยฝ second later, the ailerons rapidly deflected to 13.43ยฐ right-wing-down, the autopilot disconnected. The plane rolled rapidly to the right, and the pitch attitude and AOA began to decrease. At 15:57:45 the plane rolled through the wings-level attitude (completion of first full roll). At 15:57:48, as the plane began rolling left, back towards wings level, the airspeed increased through 260 knots, the pitch attitude decreased through 60ยฐ nose down, normal acceleration fluctuated between 2.0 and 2.5 G, and the altitude decreased through 6,000 feet. At 15:57:55, the normal acceleration increased to over 3.0 G. At 15:59 the plane impacted a wet soybean field partially inverted, in a nose down, left-wing-low attitude. All 68 occupants were killed.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal, that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern during which it intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope. The airplane was susceptible to this loss of control, and the crew was unable to recover. Contributing to the accident were 1) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; 2) the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, 3) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) failure to ensure that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions, and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result from flight in freezing rain, 4) the FAA's inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 5) ATR's inadequate response to the continued occurrence of ATR 42 icing/roll upsets which, in conjunction with information learned about aileron control difficulties during the certification and development of the ATR 42 and 72, should have prompted additional research, and the creation of updated airplane flight manuals, flightcrew operating manuals and training programs related to operation of the ATR 42 and 72 in such icing conditions."
Accident Description: instagram.com/p/CkYAUhoBhr7/?igsh=NWlka2o1bHR2bGdm
๐๐บ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ฎ๐ด๐น๐ฒ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ฐ๐ญ๐ด๐ฐ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Indianapolis to Chicago, operated by an ATR 72 (Reg. N401AM) on ๐ข๐ฐ๐๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฏ๐ญ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ต๐ฐ.
The plane departed Indianapolis at 14:55. The plane climbed to an enroute altitude of 16,300 feet. At 15:13, the flight began the descent to 10,000 feet. At 15:18, shortly after the plane leveled off at 10,000 feet, the crew received a clearance to enter a holding pattern near the LUCIT intersection and they were told to expect further clearance at 15:45, which was revised to 16:00 at 15:38. At 15:56, the controller contacted the flight and instructed the flight crew to descend to 8,000 feet. At 15:57:33, as the plane was descending through 9,130 feet, the AOA increased through 5ยฐ, and the ailerons began deflecting to a right-wing-down position.
About ยฝ second later, the ailerons rapidly deflected to 13.43ยฐ right-wing-down, the autopilot disconnected. The plane rolled rapidly to the right, and the pitch attitude and AOA began to decrease. At 15:57:45 the plane rolled through the wings-level attitude (completion of first full roll). At 15:57:48, as the plane began rolling left, back towards wings level, the airspeed increased through 260 knots, the pitch attitude decreased through 60ยฐ nose down, normal acceleration fluctuated between 2.0 and 2.5 G, and the altitude decreased through 6,000 feet. At 15:57:55, the normal acceleration increased to over 3.0 G. At 15:59 the plane impacted a wet soybean field partially inverted, in a nose down, left-wing-low attitude. All 68 occupants were killed.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal, that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern during which it intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope. The airplane was susceptible to this loss of control, and the crew was unable to recover. Contributing to the accident were 1) the French Directorate General for Civil Aviation's (DGAC's) inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72, and its failure to take the necessary corrective action to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; 2) the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with timely airworthiness information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing conditions, 3) the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) failure to ensure that aircraft icing certification requirements, operational requirements for flight into icing conditions, and FAA published aircraft icing information adequately accounted for the hazards that can result from flight in freezing rain, 4) the FAA's inadequate oversight of the ATR 42 and 72 to ensure continued airworthiness in icing conditions; and 5) ATR's inadequate response to the continued occurrence of ATR 42 icing/roll upsets which, in conjunction with information learned about aileron control difficulties during the certification and development of the ATR 42 and 72, should have prompted additional research, and the creation of updated airplane flight manuals, flightcrew operating manuals and training programs related to operation of the ATR 42 and 72 in such icing conditions."
![1947 KLM Douglas DC-3 [PH-TCR] Copenhagen disaster Aftermath Footage](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/TJG8plnkiqA/hqdefault.jpg "1947 KLM Douglas DC-3 [PH-TCR] Copenhagen disaster Aftermath Footage
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Accident Description: https://www.instagram.com/p/Cn4A2XavbZJ/?igshid=OGQ2MjdiOTE=
On ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฒ, ๐ญ๐ต๐ฐ๐ณ, a KLM Douglas DC-3 (Reg. PH-TCR) was operating a scheduled international passenger flight from Amsterdam to Stockholm with an intermediate stop in Copenhagen.
The first leg of the flight was uneventful. The plane took off from Copenhagen and was seen to enter a steep climb, pitching up to 45ยฐ. The plane then stalled at a height of about 100 meters and fell off to the left. It impacted the ground and burst into flames. All 22 occupants were killed. Among the passengers were Swedish Prince Gustaf Adolf and American singer and actress Grace Moore.
An investigation revealed that a 19-year old airport employee had been engaged in preparing the plane for departure. He had started his job 19 days prior to the accident on January 7 and did not have any prior experience. He had received incomplete instructions. He did remove the rudder lock, but failed to remove the elevator locking pins.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
It was determined that the loss of control during initial climb was caused by stabilizers blocked by a wooded lock pin. During the stopover in Copenhagen-Kastrup, a ground technician decided to put a wooded lock pin in the rudder and the stabilizer as well to avoid unnecessary movements that could cause damages as there were moderate winds in Copenhagen at that time. Before takeoff, one technician removed the wooded lock pin on the rudder but did remove the one on the stabilizer as this wooded lock pin was put by another ground technician and he was not aware of this. Furthermore, none of the crew member proceeded to a walk around check before departure and the pilots failed to check the stabilizers prior to takeoff.")
