Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 days ago
USENIX Security '26 - TAT: Attesting Trajectory Integrity of Industrial Robotic Arms
Chengtao Yao, Chengcheng Zhao, Peng Cheng, and Jiming Chen, Zhejiang University
Industrial robotic arms are central to modern manufacturing, with broad deployment in critical domains. Motion is a primary security concern, as it is a fundamental capability of robotic arms, and adversarial manipulation (e.g., altering production logic, positioning, or dynamics) can lead to product defects or physical damage. Remote attestation is a promising mechanism for verifying execution integrity. However, existing approaches focus on control-flow or data-flow properties and fail to capture motion semantics, limiting their ability to adequately verify the physical execution of robotic arms.
This paper presents Trajectory Integrity (TI) as a new security property that ensures a robotic arm's motion conforms to its intended path. To enforce TI, we design TAT, a minimally invasive attestation framework that leverages a Timed Motion Event Graph to capture motion semantics and combines event and joint measurements to verify actual motion. We implement a hardware-software prototype of TAT on an open-source robotic arm platform. Evaluation on real-world task programs shows that TAT incurs at most 2.30% memory overhead and 0.14% execution time overhead, demonstrating its performance and practicality. Furthermore, its attestation capability is evaluated under diverse motion-related parameter modifications, confirming its effectiveness in trajectory integrity attestation.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
USENIX Security '26 - TAT: Attesting Trajectory Integrity of Industrial Robotic Arms
Chengtao Yao, Chengcheng Zhao, Peng Cheng, and Jiming Chen, Zhejiang University
Industrial robotic arms are central to modern manufacturing, with broad deployment in critical domains. Motion is a primary security concern, as it is a fundamental capability of robotic arms, and adversarial manipulation (e.g., altering production logic, positioning, or dynamics) can lead to product defects or physical damage. Remote attestation is a promising mechanism for verifying execution integrity. However, existing approaches focus on control-flow or data-flow properties and fail to capture motion semantics, limiting their ability to adequately verify the physical execution of robotic arms.
This paper presents Trajectory Integrity (TI) as a new security property that ensures a robotic arm's motion conforms to its intended path. To enforce TI, we design TAT, a minimally invasive attestation framework that leverages a Timed Motion Event Graph to capture motion semantics and combines event and joint measurements to verify actual motion. We implement a hardware-software prototype of TAT on an open-source robotic arm platform. Evaluation on real-world task programs shows that TAT incurs at most 2.30% memory overhead and 0.14% execution time overhead, demonstrating its performance and practicality. Furthermore, its attestation capability is evaluated under diverse motion-related parameter modifications, confirming its effectiveness in trajectory integrity attestation.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions

![USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…
USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commitments
Michel Dellepere, Independent; Pratyush Mishra and Alireza Shirzad, University of Pennsylvania
SNARKs are powerful cryptographic primitives that allow a prover to produce a succinct proof of a computation. Two key goals of SNARK research are to minimize the size of the proof and to minimize the time required to generate it. In this work, we present new SNARK constructions that push the frontier on both of these goals.
Our first construction, Pari, is a SNARK that achieves the smallest proof size amongst all known SNARKs. Specifically, Pari achieves a proof size of just two group elements and two field elements, which, when instantiated with the BLS12-381 curve, totals just 160 bytes. This is smaller than the sizes for Groth16 [Groth, EUROCRYPT 16] and Polymath [Lipmaa, CRYPTO 24]. Pari also achieves the lowest known gas cost for on-chain SNARK verification, reducing the gas cost by 6% compared to Groth16 and 17% compared to FFLONK.
Our second construction, Garuda, is a SNARK that reduces proof generation time by supporting, for the first time, arbitrary custom gates and free linear gates (in terms of cryptographic costs). These benefits enable significant prover-time savings compared to state-of-the-art SNARKs.
Both constructions rely on a new cryptographic primitive: equifficient polynomial commitment (EPC) schemes that enforce that committed polynomials have the same representation in particular bases. We provide both rigorous security definitions for this primitive as well as efficient constructions for univariate and multilinear polynomials.
Our constructions are obtained via a new compiler that obtains a succinct argument by combining polynomial IOPs with our EPC schemes.
View the full USENIX Security 26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/sF3ApyPjguw/mqdefault.jpg)








