Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 days ago
USENIX Security '26 - Efficient Threshold ML-DSA
Sofía Celi, Brave Research and University of Bristol; Rafael del Pino and Thomas Espitau, PQShield; Guilhem Niot, PQShield and Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA; Thomas Prest, PQShield
Threshold signature schemes allow a group of users to jointly generate a digital signature, providing resilience against faults and enhancing decentralization. With the advent of post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based threshold signatures have gained attention as viable alternatives. Nevertheless, existing constructions frequently encounter challenges related to scalability, robustness, or compatibility with standardized schemes, particularly with the NIST-selected and standardised Module-Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) algorithm.
In this work, we present the first threshold signature scheme that is fully compatible with ML-DSA, supporting secure and efficient signing among up to six parties. Our construction leverages advanced short secret sharing techniques and integrates optimized rejection sampling to achieve a favourable balance between communication efficiency and correctness in distributed environments. We implement our construction in Go and evaluate its performance across local, LAN, and WAN network settings. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our threshold ML-DSA scheme is not only practically deployable but also well-suited for real-world applications, including multi-device cryptocurrency wallets, threshold-based TLS authentication, and for Tor's directory authorities.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
USENIX Security '26 - Efficient Threshold ML-DSA
Sofía Celi, Brave Research and University of Bristol; Rafael del Pino and Thomas Espitau, PQShield; Guilhem Niot, PQShield and Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA; Thomas Prest, PQShield
Threshold signature schemes allow a group of users to jointly generate a digital signature, providing resilience against faults and enhancing decentralization. With the advent of post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based threshold signatures have gained attention as viable alternatives. Nevertheless, existing constructions frequently encounter challenges related to scalability, robustness, or compatibility with standardized schemes, particularly with the NIST-selected and standardised Module-Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) algorithm.
In this work, we present the first threshold signature scheme that is fully compatible with ML-DSA, supporting secure and efficient signing among up to six parties. Our construction leverages advanced short secret sharing techniques and integrates optimized rejection sampling to achieve a favourable balance between communication efficiency and correctness in distributed environments. We implement our construction in Go and evaluate its performance across local, LAN, and WAN network settings. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our threshold ML-DSA scheme is not only practically deployable but also well-suited for real-world applications, including multi-device cryptocurrency wallets, threshold-based TLS authentication, and for Tor's directory authorities.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
![USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…
USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commitments
Michel Dellepere, Independent; Pratyush Mishra and Alireza Shirzad, University of Pennsylvania
SNARKs are powerful cryptographic primitives that allow a prover to produce a succinct proof of a computation. Two key goals of SNARK research are to minimize the size of the proof and to minimize the time required to generate it. In this work, we present new SNARK constructions that push the frontier on both of these goals.
Our first construction, Pari, is a SNARK that achieves the smallest proof size amongst all known SNARKs. Specifically, Pari achieves a proof size of just two group elements and two field elements, which, when instantiated with the BLS12-381 curve, totals just 160 bytes. This is smaller than the sizes for Groth16 [Groth, EUROCRYPT 16] and Polymath [Lipmaa, CRYPTO 24]. Pari also achieves the lowest known gas cost for on-chain SNARK verification, reducing the gas cost by 6% compared to Groth16 and 17% compared to FFLONK.
Our second construction, Garuda, is a SNARK that reduces proof generation time by supporting, for the first time, arbitrary custom gates and free linear gates (in terms of cryptographic costs). These benefits enable significant prover-time savings compared to state-of-the-art SNARKs.
Both constructions rely on a new cryptographic primitive: equifficient polynomial commitment (EPC) schemes that enforce that committed polynomials have the same representation in particular bases. We provide both rigorous security definitions for this primitive as well as efficient constructions for univariate and multilinear polynomials.
Our constructions are obtained via a new compiler that obtains a succinct argument by combining polynomial IOPs with our EPC schemes.
View the full USENIX Security 26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/sF3ApyPjguw/mqdefault.jpg)









