Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 days ago
USENIX Security '26 - Message Injection Attacks Against Signal
Kien Tuong Truong, ETH Zurich; Noemi Terzo, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Kenneth G. Paterson, ETH Zurich
Signal is a secure messaging app offering end-to-end security for pairwise and group communications. It has tens of millions of users, and has heavily influenced the design of other secure messaging apps (including WhatsApp). Signal has been heavily analysed and, as a result, is rightly regarded as setting the "gold standard" for messaging apps by the scientific community. We present two practical attacks that break the integrity properties of Signal in its advertised threat model. Each attack arises from different features of Signal that are poorly documented and have eluded formal security analyses. The first attack, affecting Android and Desktop, arises from Signal's introduction of identities based on usernames (instead of phone numbers) in early 2022. We show that the protocol for resolving identities based on usernames and on phone numbers introduced a vulnerability that allows a malicious server to inject arbitrary messages into one-to-one conversations under specific circumstances. The injection causes a user-visible alert about a change of safety numbers, but if the users compare their safety numbers, they will be correct. The second attack is even more severe. It arises from Signal's Sealed Sender (SSS) feature, designed to allow sender identities to be hidden. We show that a combination of two errors in the SSS implementation in Android allows a malicious server to inject arbitrary messages into both one-to-one and group conversations. The errors relate to missing key checks and the loss of context when cryptographic processing is distributed across multiple software components. The attack is undetectable by users and can be mounted at any time, without any preconditions. As far as we can tell, the vulnerability has been present since the introduction of SSS in 2018. We disclosed both attacks to the engineers at Signal who promptly developed and deployed patches. Beyond presenting these devastating attacks on Signal's end-to-end security guarantees, we discuss more broadly what can be learned about the challenges of deploying new security features in complex software projects.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
USENIX Security '26 - Message Injection Attacks Against Signal
Kien Tuong Truong, ETH Zurich; Noemi Terzo, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy; Kenneth G. Paterson, ETH Zurich
Signal is a secure messaging app offering end-to-end security for pairwise and group communications. It has tens of millions of users, and has heavily influenced the design of other secure messaging apps (including WhatsApp). Signal has been heavily analysed and, as a result, is rightly regarded as setting the "gold standard" for messaging apps by the scientific community. We present two practical attacks that break the integrity properties of Signal in its advertised threat model. Each attack arises from different features of Signal that are poorly documented and have eluded formal security analyses. The first attack, affecting Android and Desktop, arises from Signal's introduction of identities based on usernames (instead of phone numbers) in early 2022. We show that the protocol for resolving identities based on usernames and on phone numbers introduced a vulnerability that allows a malicious server to inject arbitrary messages into one-to-one conversations under specific circumstances. The injection causes a user-visible alert about a change of safety numbers, but if the users compare their safety numbers, they will be correct. The second attack is even more severe. It arises from Signal's Sealed Sender (SSS) feature, designed to allow sender identities to be hidden. We show that a combination of two errors in the SSS implementation in Android allows a malicious server to inject arbitrary messages into both one-to-one and group conversations. The errors relate to missing key checks and the loss of context when cryptographic processing is distributed across multiple software components. The attack is undetectable by users and can be mounted at any time, without any preconditions. As far as we can tell, the vulnerability has been present since the introduction of SSS in 2018. We disclosed both attacks to the engineers at Signal who promptly developed and deployed patches. Beyond presenting these devastating attacks on Signal's end-to-end security guarantees, we discuss more broadly what can be learned about the challenges of deploying new security features in complex software projects.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions









![USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…
USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commitments
Michel Dellepere, Independent; Pratyush Mishra and Alireza Shirzad, University of Pennsylvania
SNARKs are powerful cryptographic primitives that allow a prover to produce a succinct proof of a computation. Two key goals of SNARK research are to minimize the size of the proof and to minimize the time required to generate it. In this work, we present new SNARK constructions that push the frontier on both of these goals.
Our first construction, Pari, is a SNARK that achieves the smallest proof size amongst all known SNARKs. Specifically, Pari achieves a proof size of just two group elements and two field elements, which, when instantiated with the BLS12-381 curve, totals just 160 bytes. This is smaller than the sizes for Groth16 [Groth, EUROCRYPT 16] and Polymath [Lipmaa, CRYPTO 24]. Pari also achieves the lowest known gas cost for on-chain SNARK verification, reducing the gas cost by 6% compared to Groth16 and 17% compared to FFLONK.
Our second construction, Garuda, is a SNARK that reduces proof generation time by supporting, for the first time, arbitrary custom gates and free linear gates (in terms of cryptographic costs). These benefits enable significant prover-time savings compared to state-of-the-art SNARKs.
Both constructions rely on a new cryptographic primitive: equifficient polynomial commitment (EPC) schemes that enforce that committed polynomials have the same representation in particular bases. We provide both rigorous security definitions for this primitive as well as efficient constructions for univariate and multilinear polynomials.
Our constructions are obtained via a new compiler that obtains a succinct argument by combining polynomial IOPs with our EPC schemes.
View the full USENIX Security 26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions USENIX Security 26 - Garuda and Pari: Faster and Smaller SNARKs via Equifficient Polynomial Commit…](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/sF3ApyPjguw/mqdefault.jpg)
