Perun | Reservists and irregulars in Ukraine - "A people at war" @PerunAU | Uploaded April 2022 | Updated October 2024, 5 days ago.
For all the videos on the technical side of this conflict, the ATGMs, the MANPADS and the drones, I thought it was impossible to touch on the manpower side of this particular conflict.
If you watch enough media, you'd be forgiven for thinking Ukraine is hopelessly outnumbered in this conflict by the great Russian bear. If they've held on, so the argument goes, it's through sheer grit and determination.
The reality, I think, is that two sides are fighting very different wars. Russia, undertaking its "Special Military Operation" has focused on making up its numbers through the use of paramilitaries, allies, proxies, and mercenaries. The great bulk of Russian reservists, former conscripts, are so far staying at home.
By contrast, Ukraine seems to be mobilising as a national level. Not only are civilians joining up with the TDF and militias (something made much easier due to the number of Ukrainians who have accumulated experience in the Donbass) but they're also taking over supporting roles, from vehicle recovery to intelligence gathering, that release uniformed personnel for other duties.
In this video, I look at the use of reservists and irregulars in Ukraine. Put these deployments in their historical context, and raise questions that may be relevant for other nations seeking to bolster their national defences by investing in the capability of their societies, not just their militaries, to resist.
Corrections and notes:
As usual, there are a few corrections that I can't fix as I'm posting this from a phone while traveling:
* I incorrectly state the number of conscripts that are part of this Russian intake, the correct figure is c.134,000, not 185,000.
* There are some odd cuts in the editing. These are generally because I had originally included commentary on what Russia could do from here to escalate and improve their position. On retrospect, I considered these to be in bad taste and removed them.
* While I do stress where statements I'm making are based on partisan sources (like the Ukrainians themselves) I thought it would be worth stressing here again - be careful when relying on statements made by the belligerents or their allies. When the claims match observed reality on the ground though, there can be good cause to believe them.
Timestamps: (thanks to the usual suspect :) )
00:00 Introduction
00:33 Ukraine – the 'outnumbered' underdog
01:08 But wars aren't fought by only active-duty armies
02:01 What am I going to cover?
02:38 Key thesis
04:41 What this presentation isn't
05:37 What is with these reserve numbers?
07:47 Historical mobilisations: rapid and overwhelming
10:13 USSR mobilisation system
13:03 What about Russia?
15:54 Paramilitary forces
18:06 Chechens
20:05 Syrians
21:05 Mercenaries
22:12 Local proxies
23:42 What ties this all together?
26:02 Ukrainian experience – National Mobilisation
27:06 Ukrainian experience – UTDF and Regular Reserve
30:01 TDF and Regular Reserve (cont.)
31:23 But they're not supermen
32:58 Ukrainian experience – Militia and Irregulars
35:22 Ukrainian experience – Volunteers and Quasi Militia
36:44 Tractors – More than a meme
38:24 Defacto support services
39:19 Intelligence gathering and information warfare
40:38 Complex contemporary picture of whole-of-society resistance
42:32 Ukraine hasn't gotten it all right
44:54 Lessons we can take?
47:55 Long term decline in reserve forces
50:11 Designing a Reserve Force
50:44 Right sizing the force
52:18 Capability – What do you need them to do?
54:03 Organisation
55:29 Equipment
56:31 My takeaways
1:02:34 Outro
For all the videos on the technical side of this conflict, the ATGMs, the MANPADS and the drones, I thought it was impossible to touch on the manpower side of this particular conflict.
If you watch enough media, you'd be forgiven for thinking Ukraine is hopelessly outnumbered in this conflict by the great Russian bear. If they've held on, so the argument goes, it's through sheer grit and determination.
The reality, I think, is that two sides are fighting very different wars. Russia, undertaking its "Special Military Operation" has focused on making up its numbers through the use of paramilitaries, allies, proxies, and mercenaries. The great bulk of Russian reservists, former conscripts, are so far staying at home.
By contrast, Ukraine seems to be mobilising as a national level. Not only are civilians joining up with the TDF and militias (something made much easier due to the number of Ukrainians who have accumulated experience in the Donbass) but they're also taking over supporting roles, from vehicle recovery to intelligence gathering, that release uniformed personnel for other duties.
In this video, I look at the use of reservists and irregulars in Ukraine. Put these deployments in their historical context, and raise questions that may be relevant for other nations seeking to bolster their national defences by investing in the capability of their societies, not just their militaries, to resist.
Corrections and notes:
As usual, there are a few corrections that I can't fix as I'm posting this from a phone while traveling:
* I incorrectly state the number of conscripts that are part of this Russian intake, the correct figure is c.134,000, not 185,000.
* There are some odd cuts in the editing. These are generally because I had originally included commentary on what Russia could do from here to escalate and improve their position. On retrospect, I considered these to be in bad taste and removed them.
* While I do stress where statements I'm making are based on partisan sources (like the Ukrainians themselves) I thought it would be worth stressing here again - be careful when relying on statements made by the belligerents or their allies. When the claims match observed reality on the ground though, there can be good cause to believe them.
Timestamps: (thanks to the usual suspect :) )
00:00 Introduction
00:33 Ukraine – the 'outnumbered' underdog
01:08 But wars aren't fought by only active-duty armies
02:01 What am I going to cover?
02:38 Key thesis
04:41 What this presentation isn't
05:37 What is with these reserve numbers?
07:47 Historical mobilisations: rapid and overwhelming
10:13 USSR mobilisation system
13:03 What about Russia?
15:54 Paramilitary forces
18:06 Chechens
20:05 Syrians
21:05 Mercenaries
22:12 Local proxies
23:42 What ties this all together?
26:02 Ukrainian experience – National Mobilisation
27:06 Ukrainian experience – UTDF and Regular Reserve
30:01 TDF and Regular Reserve (cont.)
31:23 But they're not supermen
32:58 Ukrainian experience – Militia and Irregulars
35:22 Ukrainian experience – Volunteers and Quasi Militia
36:44 Tractors – More than a meme
38:24 Defacto support services
39:19 Intelligence gathering and information warfare
40:38 Complex contemporary picture of whole-of-society resistance
42:32 Ukraine hasn't gotten it all right
44:54 Lessons we can take?
47:55 Long term decline in reserve forces
50:11 Designing a Reserve Force
50:44 Right sizing the force
52:18 Capability – What do you need them to do?
54:03 Organisation
55:29 Equipment
56:31 My takeaways
1:02:34 Outro
