Operating With Adversary Supplied Components @S4Events
Operating With Adversary Supplied Components  @S4Events
Uploaded March 2025 | Updated September 2026, 1 week ago
The US Government's focus on rip and replace and bans for PRC sourced components in the grid infrastructure space has potential to make the cyber and safety landscape worse. Operating through these risks, rather than around them may be the only solution. (this same problem exists in other sectors and other countries with real and potential adversary suppliers)

Emma gives examples of where rip and replace of PRC components causes non-obvious problems and in many cases is impossible in the near to medium term. Given these facts, Emma gives alternate approaches on how to reduce the risk of continued operation with adversary supplied components.
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Operating With Adversary Supplied Components

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