Uploaded December 2021 | Updated September 2026, 9 hours ago
We believe, withhold belief, and disbelief things. We also have various levels of credence (or confidence) in things. How do these attitudes related to each other? How tightly connected are they?
Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational agent, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think.
This talk was given at the Australian National University in October 2019.
This paper is now forthcoming in Philosophical Issues. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACOTI-2
0:00 Cases where belief and credence come apart
33:26 Upshots
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Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
We believe, withhold belief, and disbelief things. We also have various levels of credence (or confidence) in things. How do these attitudes related to each other? How tightly connected are they?
Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational agent, how closely connected are belief and credence?) Ultimately, I suggest that the two attitudes are more independent than one might think.
This talk was given at the Australian National University in October 2019.
This paper is now forthcoming in Philosophical Issues. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACOTI-2
0:00 Cases where belief and credence come apart
33:26 Upshots
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
