Uploaded December 2021 | Updated September 2026, 10 hours ago
Credences are subjective probabilities that measure one's confidence level in some proposition. For example, I have a 0.9 credence it will rain tomorrow, a 0.5 credence this coin will land heads, and a credence of 0 that 1+1=3. But what are credences? On the belief-first view, they are beliefs about probabilities.
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.
This talk was given at the Degrees of Belief Conference at the University of Leeds with Andrew Moon (andrewymoon.wordpress.com/).
This paper, coauthored with Andrew Moon, is now published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/MOOCAB-3
0:00 Talk
40:44 Q&A
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Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
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Credences are subjective probabilities that measure one's confidence level in some proposition. For example, I have a 0.9 credence it will rain tomorrow, a 0.5 credence this coin will land heads, and a credence of 0 that 1+1=3. But what are credences? On the belief-first view, they are beliefs about probabilities.
This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed.
This talk was given at the Degrees of Belief Conference at the University of Leeds with Andrew Moon (andrewymoon.wordpress.com/).
This paper, coauthored with Andrew Moon, is now published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/MOOCAB-3
0:00 Talk
40:44 Q&A
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: instagram.com/lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
