Uploaded November 2021 | Updated September 2026, 3 hours ago
What is permissivism? Can you be a permissivist and an evidentialist? What does permissivism say about religious disagreement?
Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can be understood as an underdetermination thesis, and show how this moves the debate forward in fruitful ways: in distinguishing between different types of permissivism, in dispelling classic objections to permissivism, and in shedding light on the relationship between permissivism and evidentialism.
This paper was presented at the Openmindedness Conference in April 2018 with Margaret Turnbull (margaretturnbull.weebly.com/)
This paper, co-authored with with Margaret Turnbull, is forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACPUA
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23:55 Q&A
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Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
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What is permissivism? Can you be a permissivist and an evidentialist? What does permissivism say about religious disagreement?
Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can be understood as an underdetermination thesis, and show how this moves the debate forward in fruitful ways: in distinguishing between different types of permissivism, in dispelling classic objections to permissivism, and in shedding light on the relationship between permissivism and evidentialism.
This paper was presented at the Openmindedness Conference in April 2018 with Margaret Turnbull (margaretturnbull.weebly.com/)
This paper, co-authored with with Margaret Turnbull, is forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. You can download it for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACPUA
0:00 Talk
23:55 Q&A
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: @lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
