Uploaded July 2025 | Updated September 2026, 7 hours ago
Recorded as part of the CFvW Colloquium on July 16, 2025
Emergent Communication through Information Trading -
Dr. Ignacio Ojea Quintana (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich)
Abstract:
Lewis-Skyrms signaling games model an interaction between a sender and a receiver in which they learn to develop a communication system on the basis of a cooperative game that helps them match information, actions, and states of the world. Here I will present a generalization of these systems in which agents play both sender and receiver roles organized in a network, and more importantly, they play completely independent games with independent payoffs. In this fully distributed system, agents can learn to communicate using reinforcement learning, and I will show results for Erev-Roth learning, Q-learning, and Temporal-Difference learning. Grice's Cooperative Principle is encoded in the signaling structure rather than payoff structure of the system.
Recorded as part of the CFvW Colloquium on July 16, 2025
Emergent Communication through Information Trading -
Dr. Ignacio Ojea Quintana (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich)
Abstract:
Lewis-Skyrms signaling games model an interaction between a sender and a receiver in which they learn to develop a communication system on the basis of a cooperative game that helps them match information, actions, and states of the world. Here I will present a generalization of these systems in which agents play both sender and receiver roles organized in a network, and more importantly, they play completely independent games with independent payoffs. In this fully distributed system, agents can learn to communicate using reinforcement learning, and I will show results for Erev-Roth learning, Q-learning, and Temporal-Difference learning. Grice's Cooperative Principle is encoded in the signaling structure rather than payoff structure of the system.
