Uploaded December 2024 | Updated September 2026, 2 hours ago
Recorded as part of the CFvW Colloquium on 04. December 2024
COI Stories II: Inferences or Incentives? - Prof. Dr. Michel Janssen (Lichtenberg Group for History and Philosophy of Physics, University of Bonn & School of Physics & Astronomy, University of Minnesota)
Abstract:
In 2002*, I introduced COI (Common Origin Inference) as a subspecies of IBE (Inference to the Best Explanation). Several of my examples of COIs from the history of science, however, were not really about inference. In these examples, COI served not so much to increase the degree of belief in the inferred explanation as to establish the pursuit-worthiness of that explanation. In view of this (and sticking to the acronyms), I argue that we should allow the ‘I’ in both COI and IBE to stand not only for ‘Inference’ but also for ‘Incentive’ (to pursue some [common-origin] explanation). In science, the ‘I’ in most cases stands for ‘Incentive’. Switching from ‘Inference’ to ‘Incentive’ provides an answer to an objection to IBE articulated most forcefully by Wesley Salmon in 2001: Why should an elegant explanation be more likely than an ugly one? Or, to rephrase Salmon’s question in the terminology introduced by Peter Lipton, a staunch defender of IBE: why should likeliness track loveliness? Interpreting the ‘I’ in COI and IBE as ‘Incentive’, one can take the position that pursuit-worthiness tracks loveliness, which is more plausible.
* COI Stories: Explanation and Evidence in the History of Science. Perspectives on Science. The MIT Press Volume 10, Number 4, Winter 2002 pp. 457-522, muse.jhu.edu/article/43975
Explore our colloquium schedule on our website: uni-tuebingen.de/en/research/centers-and-institutes/carl-friedrich-von-weizsaecker-center/news-and-events/carl-friedrich-von-weizsaecker-colloquium
Recorded as part of the CFvW Colloquium on 04. December 2024
COI Stories II: Inferences or Incentives? - Prof. Dr. Michel Janssen (Lichtenberg Group for History and Philosophy of Physics, University of Bonn & School of Physics & Astronomy, University of Minnesota)
Abstract:
In 2002*, I introduced COI (Common Origin Inference) as a subspecies of IBE (Inference to the Best Explanation). Several of my examples of COIs from the history of science, however, were not really about inference. In these examples, COI served not so much to increase the degree of belief in the inferred explanation as to establish the pursuit-worthiness of that explanation. In view of this (and sticking to the acronyms), I argue that we should allow the ‘I’ in both COI and IBE to stand not only for ‘Inference’ but also for ‘Incentive’ (to pursue some [common-origin] explanation). In science, the ‘I’ in most cases stands for ‘Incentive’. Switching from ‘Inference’ to ‘Incentive’ provides an answer to an objection to IBE articulated most forcefully by Wesley Salmon in 2001: Why should an elegant explanation be more likely than an ugly one? Or, to rephrase Salmon’s question in the terminology introduced by Peter Lipton, a staunch defender of IBE: why should likeliness track loveliness? Interpreting the ‘I’ in COI and IBE as ‘Incentive’, one can take the position that pursuit-worthiness tracks loveliness, which is more plausible.
* COI Stories: Explanation and Evidence in the History of Science. Perspectives on Science. The MIT Press Volume 10, Number 4, Winter 2002 pp. 457-522, muse.jhu.edu/article/43975
Explore our colloquium schedule on our website: uni-tuebingen.de/en/research/centers-and-institutes/carl-friedrich-von-weizsaecker-center/news-and-events/carl-friedrich-von-weizsaecker-colloquium
