Uploaded May 2021 | Updated September 2026, 1 day ago
Dr. Justin Vlasits: Accuracy and the Epistemic Value of Inquiry
In recent years, the accuracy-first program in formal epistemology has emerged as a promising way to unify epistemic norms by explaining them all through maximized expected accuracy. So far, the program has focused on justifying various norms on belief and credal states, but since it is supposed to support a general monism about epistemic value, it should also explain the epistemic value of inquiry. In this talk, I prove a general theorem that shows that no non-trivial inquiry ever maximizes expected accuracy, and hence that no accuracy-first explanation of the value of inquiry is possible. I conclude by showing that if we follow Pierce in the idea that opinionation is an epistemic value, we can explain the epistemic value of inquiry.
The talk was given at the Philosophy of Science & Methodology Colloquium (University of Tübingen) organized by Prof. Dr. Alexandra Zinke and Prof. Dr. Hong Yu Wong.
Dr. Justin Vlasits: Accuracy and the Epistemic Value of Inquiry
In recent years, the accuracy-first program in formal epistemology has emerged as a promising way to unify epistemic norms by explaining them all through maximized expected accuracy. So far, the program has focused on justifying various norms on belief and credal states, but since it is supposed to support a general monism about epistemic value, it should also explain the epistemic value of inquiry. In this talk, I prove a general theorem that shows that no non-trivial inquiry ever maximizes expected accuracy, and hence that no accuracy-first explanation of the value of inquiry is possible. I conclude by showing that if we follow Pierce in the idea that opinionation is an epistemic value, we can explain the epistemic value of inquiry.
The talk was given at the Philosophy of Science & Methodology Colloquium (University of Tübingen) organized by Prof. Dr. Alexandra Zinke and Prof. Dr. Hong Yu Wong.
