DEF CON 34 - Adversary - Microsoft and Amazon are my Favorite C2 Providers - Robert Pimentel @DEFCONConference
DEF CON 34 - Adversary - Microsoft and Amazon are my Favorite C2 Providers - Robert Pimentel  @DEFCONConference
Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 1 day ago
Cloud relay services are the perfect C2 infrastructure, and most organizations cannot block them without breaking legitimate business operations.

This talk presents a comprehensive offensive analysis of three abuse vectors across Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services, weaponizing cloud services that enterprises depend on daily for command and control, lateral movement, and persistent access. We target Azure Relay Bridge, AWS IoT Secure Tunneling, and AWS IoT Core MQTT, services whose endpoint domains (*.servicebus.windows.net, *.iot.amazonaws.com) enterprises cannot blocklist without crippling legitimate business operations.

I'll demonstrate that these are not isolated findings but instances of a repeatable pattern: cloud relay weaponization. Any cloud service that brokers connections through trusted infrastructure, requires only outbound HTTPS, and shares domains with business critical services is a candidate for C2 abuse. I'll present the methodology for identifying these services and validated attack chains for each.

For Azure Relay Bridge, the attacker deploys azbridge, a legitimate Microsoft-authored, open-source tool, to tunnel arbitrary TCP traffic through Azure's relay infrastructure, appearing as standard HTTPS to *.servicebus.windows.net. It installs as a persistent system service across Windows, Linux, and macOS. The abuse here is trust in Microsoft's infrastructure and shared service domains, not a pre-existing binary on the host.

For AWS IoT, I'll present two complementary techniques. First, Secure Tunneling: the attacker uses their own AWS account to create encrypted WebSocket tunnels via the officially published localproxy binary, generating no control plane API activity in the target's CloudTrail. I validated this with Sliver C2 across three protocols (mTLS, HTTPS, HTTP), but discovered operational limitations including 12 hour tunnel maximums, token rotation complexity, and IoT optimized bandwidth caps that constrain persistent C2 use. These limitations led to the second technique: weaponizing AWS IoT Core MQTT as a full C2 transport channel using X.509 mutual TLS authentication, which eliminates the tunnel lifetime and bandwidth constraints entirely.
I'll also present custom Mythic C2 agents (Poseidon for Linux/macOS, Apollo for Windows) with transport profiles for both Azure Relay and AWS IoT MQTT, all end to end validated on AMD64 and ARM64. Live demonstrations showcase complete attack chains: Mythic beaconing through Azure Relay, lateral movement via IoT Secure Tunneling, and persistent C2 over IoT Core MQTT, all through traffic indistinguishable from legitimate cloud service usage.

Attendees leave with released Mythic C2 agents and profiles for Azure and AWS, a framework for identifying additional cloud relay services, detection engineering guidance mapped to the Pyramid of Pain, and actionable defensive hardening for both cloud providers.
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DEF CON 34 - Adversary - Microsoft and Amazon are my Favorite C2 Providers - Robert Pimentel

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