Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 1 day ago
A program crashes with a segmentation fault. Then, it crashes again. And again. What looks like crazy behaviour is actually an exploit, running one crash at a time.
In this talk, we present Segmentation Fault-Oriented Programming (SFOP), a novel exploitation technique that weaponizes 12 previously unknown weaknesses in the Linux kernel's handling of signals to execute arbitrary code. SFOP is designed to bypass Intel CET, the most widely deployed hardware Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) scheme on modern x86-64 systems, built to stop classic code-reuse attacks such as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Sigreturn-Oriented Programming (SROP). Unlike previous CFI bypass techniques, SFOP is a general-purpose technique that can by-default reliably exploit any vulnerable x86-64 application with Intel CET enabled, becoming the lowest-hanging fruit attack after Intel CET.
We will show how SFOP bypasses CFI and turns a single memory-corruption vulnerability into arbitrary code execution on real-world targets. Through practical exploits, we demonstrate that what appears to be a process trapped in a crash loop is, in reality, attacker-controlled execution progressing fault by fault. Finally, we discuss the underlying weaknesses that make SFOP possible and the mitigations needed to defend against this new class of attacks.
Our paper has a ~50 references, like most academic papers. We have references to the Linux kernel lines that showcase the vulnerabilities we find, even! Here we copy paste our references, but everything is properly ordered in the paper.
A program crashes with a segmentation fault. Then, it crashes again. And again. What looks like crazy behaviour is actually an exploit, running one crash at a time.
In this talk, we present Segmentation Fault-Oriented Programming (SFOP), a novel exploitation technique that weaponizes 12 previously unknown weaknesses in the Linux kernel's handling of signals to execute arbitrary code. SFOP is designed to bypass Intel CET, the most widely deployed hardware Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) scheme on modern x86-64 systems, built to stop classic code-reuse attacks such as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Sigreturn-Oriented Programming (SROP). Unlike previous CFI bypass techniques, SFOP is a general-purpose technique that can by-default reliably exploit any vulnerable x86-64 application with Intel CET enabled, becoming the lowest-hanging fruit attack after Intel CET.
We will show how SFOP bypasses CFI and turns a single memory-corruption vulnerability into arbitrary code execution on real-world targets. Through practical exploits, we demonstrate that what appears to be a process trapped in a crash loop is, in reality, attacker-controlled execution progressing fault by fault. Finally, we discuss the underlying weaknesses that make SFOP possible and the mitigations needed to defend against this new class of attacks.
Our paper has a ~50 references, like most academic papers. We have references to the Linux kernel lines that showcase the vulnerabilities we find, even! Here we copy paste our references, but everything is properly ordered in the paper.










