Uploaded November 2021 | Updated September 2026, 10 hours ago
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical stakes can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases, which vindicates evidentialism.
First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.
This talk was given at the Central APA in February 2019, with comments by Rima Basu.
This paper is now published in The Philosophical Quarterly. You can download this paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACHBD
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25:32 Comments
37:32 Q&A
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Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
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Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical stakes can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases, which vindicates evidentialism.
First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.
This talk was given at the Central APA in February 2019, with comments by Rima Basu.
This paper is now published in The Philosophical Quarterly. You can download this paper for free here: philpapers.org/rec/JACHBD
0:00 Talk
25:32 Comments
37:32 Q&A
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: http://liz-jackson.com/public-philoso...
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: @lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
