Air Crash Daily | Atlantic Southeast Airlines (ASA) Flight 529 ATC Recording @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded May 2024 | Updated October 2024, 1 day ago.
Credit(s)/Source(s): @elsopaipilla315 & CONUS Archive
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description:
instagram.com/p/ChhbufuBhyj/?igsh=NnkzOTdoMzh2cWZh
𝗔𝘁𝗹𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗰 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟱𝟮𝟵 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Atlanta to Gulfport, operated by an Embraer EMB-120 Brasilia (Reg. N256AS) on 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟭, 𝟭𝟵𝟵𝟱.
The plane departed Atlanta at 12:23. At 12:42 it was cleared to climb to FL240. When climbing through FL181, at a speed of 160 knots, the no. 1 engine torque fell from 63% to 0% and a loud thud was heard. The Brasilia rolled left, pitched down and started to descend. With a loud bang, 1 of the 4 blades (Hamilton Standard 14RF-9) had separated. The prop couldn't be feathered and an emergency was declared. The plane descended at a rate of 1,000-2,000 ft/min.
The Brasilia appeared to be too difficult to control to reach Atlanta. ATC provided Flight 529 with vectors to West Georgia Regional Airport. At 12:53 the airspeed steadily decreased from 168 knots to 120 knots IAS. One minute later, the plane contacted trees in a 20° nose-down attitude and an increasing left-wing-down attitude of 15°-40°. The Brasilia flew another 360 feet before crashing into a field. The captain and 7 passengers were killed.
𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲:
"The in-flight fatigue fracture and separation of a propeller blade resulting in distortion of the left engine nacelle, causing excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control of the airplane. The fracture was caused by a fatigue crack from multiple corrosion pits that were not discovered by Hamilton Standard because of inadequate and ineffective corporate inspection and repair techniques, training, documentation and communication.
Contributing to the accident was Hamilton Standard's and FAA's failure to require recurrent on-wing ultrasonic inspections for the affected propellers. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the overcast cloud ceiling at the accident site."
Credit(s)/Source(s): @elsopaipilla315 & CONUS Archive
Follow us on Instagram: instagram.com/aircrashdaily/?hl=en
Accident Description:
instagram.com/p/ChhbufuBhyj/?igsh=NnkzOTdoMzh2cWZh
𝗔𝘁𝗹𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗰 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟱𝟮𝟵 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Atlanta to Gulfport, operated by an Embraer EMB-120 Brasilia (Reg. N256AS) on 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟭, 𝟭𝟵𝟵𝟱.
The plane departed Atlanta at 12:23. At 12:42 it was cleared to climb to FL240. When climbing through FL181, at a speed of 160 knots, the no. 1 engine torque fell from 63% to 0% and a loud thud was heard. The Brasilia rolled left, pitched down and started to descend. With a loud bang, 1 of the 4 blades (Hamilton Standard 14RF-9) had separated. The prop couldn't be feathered and an emergency was declared. The plane descended at a rate of 1,000-2,000 ft/min.
The Brasilia appeared to be too difficult to control to reach Atlanta. ATC provided Flight 529 with vectors to West Georgia Regional Airport. At 12:53 the airspeed steadily decreased from 168 knots to 120 knots IAS. One minute later, the plane contacted trees in a 20° nose-down attitude and an increasing left-wing-down attitude of 15°-40°. The Brasilia flew another 360 feet before crashing into a field. The captain and 7 passengers were killed.
𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲:
"The in-flight fatigue fracture and separation of a propeller blade resulting in distortion of the left engine nacelle, causing excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control of the airplane. The fracture was caused by a fatigue crack from multiple corrosion pits that were not discovered by Hamilton Standard because of inadequate and ineffective corporate inspection and repair techniques, training, documentation and communication.
Contributing to the accident was Hamilton Standard's and FAA's failure to require recurrent on-wing ultrasonic inspections for the affected propellers. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the overcast cloud ceiling at the accident site."
![2004 Macedonian Government Beechcraft Super King Air [Z3-BAB] crash CVR Recording](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/P-33Ag2c-zI/hqdefault.jpg "2004 Macedonian Government Beechcraft Super King Air [Z3-BAB] crash CVR Recording
On 𝗙𝗲𝗯𝗿𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟲, 𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟰, a Beechcraft Super King Air (Reg. Z3-BAB) departed Skopje on an official flight to Mostar, carrying 2 pilots and 7 passengers, among them Boris Trajkovski, President of the Republic of Macedonia. Trajkovski was flying to Mostar with members of his government to take part to an economic conference.
The plane departed Skopje at 06:48. At 07:46, ACC Zagreb transferred the plane to APP Mostar. At 07:51, the flight crew reported overhead IAF DIRUK. After IAF DIRUK, the flight crew performed a left turn for 180° and established heading 146°, at 4,700 feet. During last 60° of the turn the flight crew noticed that indications of DME and VOR were lost. The flight crew reported to APP Mostar that they do not have indication of VOR. After 18 seconds co-pilot confirmed to the captain that indicator VOR/DME has been established again and that everything is under control what was conveyed to APP Mostar by the captain.
At distance of 13 NM to VOR/DME MSR, after the approved by the captain, co-pilot disengaged autopilot and had taken the control of the plane. After passing 7 NM to VOR/DME MSR the plane continued with descending on assigned radial 326. And 31 seconds later the plane reached the altitude of 1,810 feet (MDA). The co-pilot then asked for permission from the captain to continue with descent, on which captain did not reply but ordered to co-pilot to increase the power. After that the plane impacted the tree and right after the ground as well.
𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲:
Aircraft accident of Z3-BAB is caused by:
Non-compliance with published approach procedure at Mostar airport, regarding distance and altitude, resulted in Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗯𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀:
→ Inadequate briefing of the flight crew for performing the flight,
→ Check list was not consulted,
→ Lack of Crew Resources Management (CRM) practice during flight,
→ Flight crew decision to land at Mostar airport, despite cloud ceiling being below MDA,
→ Flight crew decision to continue flight after loss of VOR/DME indication.")
