Uploaded February 2024 | Updated September 2026, 5 hours ago
The world is religiously ambiguous: It can be interpreted in various incompatible ways, and the interpreters are not necessarily violating any standards of rationality in doing so. As for me, I can’t say that I feel any position being forced on me by the evidence. My best efforts to judge the total balance of evidence weighing for and against theism leave me thinking that no one has a decisive case; and the main way to give the impression of having a decisive case is to ignore the total evidence, focusing solely or primarily on the facts that support your position. Put a spotlight on the things that favor your view, and minimize or cast aside the things that don’t fit.
Over time, I've come to appreciate the force of some of the evidence against the hypothesis of indifference and in favor of a "value selection hypothesis", e.g. psychophysical harmony, fine-tuning, and the axiological trajectory of the universe. These, along with a few other considerations that favor theism more directly, have gradually moved me to more of a middle position on theism vs. atheism. (Today, I don’t dive into a full-fledged defense of those arguments.)
There are plenty of sources of epistemic uncertainty that have increasingly led me to hold on to my beliefs more loosely. How am I supposed to alter my confidence in light of peer disagreement? How should I set my priors? How am I supposed to reckon with the inescapable contingency of my beliefs? Richard Rorty often spoke about a certain kind of philosopher with “radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered” (1989). Rorty goes much further, in ways that I can’t get behind. But what can I say? I’m impressed by many of you. The problem is that you have mutually exclusive, incommensurable worldviews. At least for me, at this point, agnosticism seems like the most honest reaction to my epistemic situation. (Of course, God could settle this whenever he likes: https://x.com/waldenpod/status/1749836106973970860?s=20)
Relevant video from Philip Swenson: youtu.be/MZR-PoFIRsw?si=jpuq9HaDYORRQHyN
Linktree https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
/ timestamps /
00:00 Religious Ambiguity
6:37 The Value Selection Hypothesis
8:45 Theism and Evil
12:46 Psychophysical Harmony and Physical Complexity
14:29 Axiological Arc of the Universe
17:05 Two Pretty Good Value Selection Hypotheses
18:38 Is that you, God?
20:00 Common Consent Argument
22:46 Agnostic?
The world is religiously ambiguous: It can be interpreted in various incompatible ways, and the interpreters are not necessarily violating any standards of rationality in doing so. As for me, I can’t say that I feel any position being forced on me by the evidence. My best efforts to judge the total balance of evidence weighing for and against theism leave me thinking that no one has a decisive case; and the main way to give the impression of having a decisive case is to ignore the total evidence, focusing solely or primarily on the facts that support your position. Put a spotlight on the things that favor your view, and minimize or cast aside the things that don’t fit.
Over time, I've come to appreciate the force of some of the evidence against the hypothesis of indifference and in favor of a "value selection hypothesis", e.g. psychophysical harmony, fine-tuning, and the axiological trajectory of the universe. These, along with a few other considerations that favor theism more directly, have gradually moved me to more of a middle position on theism vs. atheism. (Today, I don’t dive into a full-fledged defense of those arguments.)
There are plenty of sources of epistemic uncertainty that have increasingly led me to hold on to my beliefs more loosely. How am I supposed to alter my confidence in light of peer disagreement? How should I set my priors? How am I supposed to reckon with the inescapable contingency of my beliefs? Richard Rorty often spoke about a certain kind of philosopher with “radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered” (1989). Rorty goes much further, in ways that I can’t get behind. But what can I say? I’m impressed by many of you. The problem is that you have mutually exclusive, incommensurable worldviews. At least for me, at this point, agnosticism seems like the most honest reaction to my epistemic situation. (Of course, God could settle this whenever he likes: https://x.com/waldenpod/status/1749836106973970860?s=20)
Relevant video from Philip Swenson: youtu.be/MZR-PoFIRsw?si=jpuq9HaDYORRQHyN
Linktree https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
/ timestamps /
00:00 Religious Ambiguity
6:37 The Value Selection Hypothesis
8:45 Theism and Evil
12:46 Psychophysical Harmony and Physical Complexity
14:29 Axiological Arc of the Universe
17:05 Two Pretty Good Value Selection Hypotheses
18:38 Is that you, God?
20:00 Common Consent Argument
22:46 Agnostic?





![Widespread Theistic Belief is Evidence for Theism
I joined @DryApologist and @johnbuck4008 to speak about the common consent argument, which is typically dismissed as fallacious without much consideration. However, I think the fact that most people in recorded history have believed in something godlike is some evidence favoring the existence of the divine. We discuss why thats the case, as well as the only good response to the argument: the evolutionary debunking response.
Defending the argument from widespread theistic belief: https://youtu.be/lF6Z7uKiHpQ (There are plenty of objections you may have thought of that didnt come up in this video. Theyre probably discussed in the longer video linked here ^ )
How did religion evolve? https://youtu.be/ARPxNYNgiSc
Full conversation with Dry Apologist, John Buck, and Chris Rhodes: https://www.youtube.com/live/NgwBQ0EwXU8?feature=share
Linktree: https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
. . .
“[Ad populum] is the ‘fallacy’ of believing something because most people believe it. But what exactly is supposed to be wrong with that? . . . Maybe the idea is that most people believing p is irrelevant to whether p is true. I.e., if most people believe it, that doesn’t mean it is more likely to be correct. Problem: This is obviously wrong. If most people believe something, that obviously does make it more likely to be correct than if most people don’t believe it. If most of our beliefs weren’t true, the human species would die out pretty much immediately. Sometimes, people elaborate on this ‘fallacy’ by citing examples of beliefs that were once widely held but were false – e.g., that the sun orbits the Earth. So let me now just mention a few typical examples of beliefs that are widely held: Dogs exist. It’s generally lighter in the daytime than at night. The sky is blue, not red, green, or yellow. There are more than three human beings in existence. Human beings commonly have beliefs and desires. Putting your hand in a fire hurts. Six is more than two. The Earth has existed for more than five minutes. When you drop rocks near the surface of the Earth, they generally fall. . . . I’m sure you can extend that list for a long time. Now, which would you say there are more of: Widely-held beliefs that are true, or ones that are false?”
Michael Huemer (Knowledge, Reality, and Value) Widespread Theistic Belief is Evidence for Theism](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/RxW8mlvQs5c/mqdefault.jpg)




