Your Route Was Dropped—But Where and Why? Closing RPKI’s Operational Feedback Gap @TeamNANOG
Your Route Was Dropped—But Where and Why? Closing RPKI’s Operational Feedback Gap  @TeamNANOG
Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
Route Origin Validation (ROV) helps prevent prefix hijacking by allowing networks to reject BGP routes that are inconsistent with published Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). For prefix owners, however, such rejection is largely silent: an announcement may be filtered somewhere on the Internet, yet the owner has no direct way to learn where it was rejected, how much reachability was lost, or whether the invalid route resulted from an attack or the owner’s own operational action.

This lack of feedback matters because not every ROV-invalid route is malicious. Benign invalid routes can arise from configuration mistakes or urgent routing changes, such as redirecting traffic to a mitigation provider during a DDoS attack before the corresponding ROA update has propagated. In this talk, we characterize these benign-invalid scenarios and use measurement data and large-scale simulations to show how silent filtering can delay diagnosis and impair reachability.

We then present interactive ROV (iROV) as one possible direction for closing this feedback gap. iROV allows a validating network to obtain just-in-time authorization from the prefix owner while notifying the owner of the invalid announcement and its observed impact. Our evaluation shows that this approach can increase reachability for urgent route changes from 23% to nearly 90%, while bounding query load through validity stapling and probabilistic querying. We present iROV as a concrete starting point for discussion with the operator community: What feedback should ROV provide, and how could such feedback be introduced without creating unacceptable operational or security risks?

Min Suk Kang:
Min Suk has been an Associate Professor in the School of Computing at KAIST since September 2023. Before joining KAIST in 2020, he was an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science, School of Computing, at the National University of Singapore, where he had been a faculty member since 2016. His research interests are in network and distributed systems security, blockchain security, and wireless network security. He received his PhD in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Carnegie Mellon University in 2016.
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Your Route Was Dropped—But Where and Why? Closing RPKI’s Operational Feedback Gap

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