Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
Kenny Boyce discusses the recent critiques of probability in the philosophy of religion, principally by John Norton. Kenny is an all-around great guy and (given his considerable philosophical overlap with my own views) a genius.
This interview is also available as a podcast:
Apple Podcasts:
Spotify:
Substack: mileskdonahue.substack.com/p/105-we-can-use-probability-to-reason?r=1pf1v9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
Check out my Substack where you can get a paid membership because you're awesome: mileskdonahue.substack.com
To support the channel, do please oh please consider donating via Buy Me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/mileskdonahue.
Follow me on X: twitter.com/PhilosopherMKD
EPISODE CHAPTERS
00:00 Introduction
00:06 What is the fine-tuning argument?
01:40 Epistemic vs. objective probability
03:40 Why epistemic priors are necessary
07:39 Can probability apply without empirical data?
09:41 John Norton's material theory of induction
13:05 Bayesianism vs. Norton's approach to induction
18:55 The outcome space objection to Bayesianism
26:02 The problem of the priors
28:08 Evidential support and rational belief
33:01 Must rational credences obey the probability axioms?
36:45 Can credences be incomparable?
42:24 Are fine-tuning probabilities unjustified?
50:20 Could deeper physics explain fine-tuning?
52:34 The prior probabilities of theism and naturalism
58:55 Kenny's greatest philosophical uncertainty
Kenny Boyce discusses the recent critiques of probability in the philosophy of religion, principally by John Norton. Kenny is an all-around great guy and (given his considerable philosophical overlap with my own views) a genius.
This interview is also available as a podcast:
Apple Podcasts:
Spotify:
Substack: mileskdonahue.substack.com/p/105-we-can-use-probability-to-reason?r=1pf1v9&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
Check out my Substack where you can get a paid membership because you're awesome: mileskdonahue.substack.com
To support the channel, do please oh please consider donating via Buy Me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/mileskdonahue.
Follow me on X: twitter.com/PhilosopherMKD
EPISODE CHAPTERS
00:00 Introduction
00:06 What is the fine-tuning argument?
01:40 Epistemic vs. objective probability
03:40 Why epistemic priors are necessary
07:39 Can probability apply without empirical data?
09:41 John Norton's material theory of induction
13:05 Bayesianism vs. Norton's approach to induction
18:55 The outcome space objection to Bayesianism
26:02 The problem of the priors
28:08 Evidential support and rational belief
33:01 Must rational credences obey the probability axioms?
36:45 Can credences be incomparable?
42:24 Are fine-tuning probabilities unjustified?
50:20 Could deeper physics explain fine-tuning?
52:34 The prior probabilities of theism and naturalism
58:55 Kenny's greatest philosophical uncertainty










