Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
A talk in the John Austin Seminar Series
Speaker: Prof Alexander Sarch (University of Surrey)
Chair: Prof George Letsas, Professor of Philosophy of Law (UCL Laws)
About the Seminar:
Legal Moralists think the culpable wrongness constraint is an important limit on what conduct may be criminalized. But does it really have teeth in practice? Is it too weak to be worth paying attention to, especially for busy legislators? In this chapter (part of a larger book project entitled Making a Morally Better Criminal Law), I argue that the constraint remains a practically important factor in the wider criminalization inquiry. In particular, I tackle three related challenges: (1) why the constraint matters even if it is only defeasible, (2) why it remains a stringent constraint whose violation generates a range of weighty complaints, and (3) why the sophisticated attempts to reconcile the constraint with mala prohibita offenses do not render the constraint too trivial and easily satisfied to worry about. In responding to each of these challenges, I try to help build the case that culpable wrongness constraint matters in practice.
About the Speaker:
Alex Sarch is a professor at University of Surrey Law School. His research tackles theoretical and doctrinal questions about the criminal law, with a particular emphasis on culpable mental states (mens rea) and the fundamental limits on the reach of criminal liability. He was Head of School at Surrey Law School from 2018-2021, did a J.D. at University of Michigan Law School, Ph.D. in philosophy at University of Massachusetts Amherst and clerked on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
A talk in the John Austin Seminar Series
Speaker: Prof Alexander Sarch (University of Surrey)
Chair: Prof George Letsas, Professor of Philosophy of Law (UCL Laws)
About the Seminar:
Legal Moralists think the culpable wrongness constraint is an important limit on what conduct may be criminalized. But does it really have teeth in practice? Is it too weak to be worth paying attention to, especially for busy legislators? In this chapter (part of a larger book project entitled Making a Morally Better Criminal Law), I argue that the constraint remains a practically important factor in the wider criminalization inquiry. In particular, I tackle three related challenges: (1) why the constraint matters even if it is only defeasible, (2) why it remains a stringent constraint whose violation generates a range of weighty complaints, and (3) why the sophisticated attempts to reconcile the constraint with mala prohibita offenses do not render the constraint too trivial and easily satisfied to worry about. In responding to each of these challenges, I try to help build the case that culpable wrongness constraint matters in practice.
About the Speaker:
Alex Sarch is a professor at University of Surrey Law School. His research tackles theoretical and doctrinal questions about the criminal law, with a particular emphasis on culpable mental states (mens rea) and the fundamental limits on the reach of criminal liability. He was Head of School at Surrey Law School from 2018-2021, did a J.D. at University of Michigan Law School, Ph.D. in philosophy at University of Massachusetts Amherst and clerked on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.










