Uploaded March 2025 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
13 February 2025
This lecture was delivered by Professor Melissa Lane, as part of the Current Legal Problems Lecture Series 2024-25
Speaker: Professor Melissa Lane (Princeton University)
Chair: The Right Hon Lady Rose of Colmworth (Justice of the Supreme Court)
About the lecture
H.L.A. Hart’s genealogical account of the emergence of law lays little stress on its promulgation, and even less on any role for writing or any other particular technology of writing. Yet if we consider the emergence of ancient Greek laws, especially as the classical Greeks themselves understood that emergence, we find the questions of promulgation and writing to have been repeatedly highlighted. These questions were especially associated with the attributions made by classical Greeks to the figures of the great lawgivers, some of whom certainly existed (Solon of Athens), others of whom may be apocryphal (Lycurgus of Sparta). I argue that these lawgivers were figures in whom the question of promulgation and its best means could be linked to the ethical purpose of law in educating citizens. Indeed, each singular lawgiver was attributed with a particular telos or purpose unifying the body of laws that they promulgated. By taking ancient Greek history as a case study for the emergence of law, and considering the role putatively played by lawgivers (as understood by classical Greeks themselves), we can reconsider the approach of modern legal theory to the questions of both promulgation and ethical purpose.
13 February 2025
This lecture was delivered by Professor Melissa Lane, as part of the Current Legal Problems Lecture Series 2024-25
Speaker: Professor Melissa Lane (Princeton University)
Chair: The Right Hon Lady Rose of Colmworth (Justice of the Supreme Court)
About the lecture
H.L.A. Hart’s genealogical account of the emergence of law lays little stress on its promulgation, and even less on any role for writing or any other particular technology of writing. Yet if we consider the emergence of ancient Greek laws, especially as the classical Greeks themselves understood that emergence, we find the questions of promulgation and writing to have been repeatedly highlighted. These questions were especially associated with the attributions made by classical Greeks to the figures of the great lawgivers, some of whom certainly existed (Solon of Athens), others of whom may be apocryphal (Lycurgus of Sparta). I argue that these lawgivers were figures in whom the question of promulgation and its best means could be linked to the ethical purpose of law in educating citizens. Indeed, each singular lawgiver was attributed with a particular telos or purpose unifying the body of laws that they promulgated. By taking ancient Greek history as a case study for the emergence of law, and considering the role putatively played by lawgivers (as understood by classical Greeks themselves), we can reconsider the approach of modern legal theory to the questions of both promulgation and ethical purpose.
