Uploaded October 2023 | Updated September 2026, 19 hours ago
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations.
Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea.
After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism:
- Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.
- The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers.
- The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind.
- Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony.
LINKTREE https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
/ timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
00:43 What is epiphenomenalism?
02:27 Conservation of energy, Libet experiments
07:42 Self-Defeat
16:44 Evidence of Causation & A Dilemma
23:20 The Phenomenal Powers View
28:00 Psychophysical Harmony
32:24 Epiphenomenalism is Counterintuitive
40:02 Summary
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations.
Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea.
After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism:
- Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.
- The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers.
- The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind.
- Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony.
LINKTREE https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
/ timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
00:43 What is epiphenomenalism?
02:27 Conservation of energy, Libet experiments
07:42 Self-Defeat
16:44 Evidence of Causation & A Dilemma
23:20 The Phenomenal Powers View
28:00 Psychophysical Harmony
32:24 Epiphenomenalism is Counterintuitive
40:02 Summary







![Why I dont care about logical fallacies [Full Podcast Episode]
Take a look at nearly any book on critical thinking and you’ll come across a list of fallacies: ad hominem, argument from ignorance, appeal to emotion, appeal to authority, post hoc ergo propter hoc, god of the gaps, and so on. The problem is that many of these “fallacies” closely resemble good lines of reasoning. Overreliance on fallacy lists – common practice in the skeptic community – fosters shallow criticism, distracts from the substance of an issue, and doesn’t even accomplish the ostensible purpose of demarcating good and bad reasoning.
I’m hard on skeptics in this episode, but that’s because I used to lean on this crutch myself. Over time, the usefulness of this approach struck me as less and less credible, and talk about fallacies tapered off. Fortunately, philosophers like Maarten Boudry and Michael Huemer, whose work you can find below, explained in clear terms what is so unhelpful about this mode of thinking. “Fallacy theory,” as Boudry calls it, is only one feature of a shallow, facile mode of philosophizing, one which isn’t very conducive to a genuine search for truth. I would suggest that one way of improving the quality of our discourse would be to lay off the fallacy accusations a bit. It would lead to a more fruitful search for knowledge and understanding.
After the first five minutes or so of big picture criticism, the bulk of the episode is dedicated to concrete examples, focusing on the ad hominem fallacy, ad populum, “correlation does not imply causation” – the post hoc ergo propter hoc (or cum hoc) fallacy – and begging the question.
https://linktr.ee/emersongreen
The Fallacy Fork: Why It’s Time to Get Rid of Fallacy Theory - Maarten Boudry https://maartenboudry.be/2017/06/the-fallacy-fork-why-its-time-to-get.html
Playing Fallacy “Gotcha!” - Maarten Boudry https://maartenboudry.be/2018/01/playing-fallacy-gotcha.html
Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy - Michael Huemer https://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Reality-Value-Mostly-Philosophy/dp/B091F5QTDS
The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life - Maarten Boudry, Fabio Paglieri & Massimo Pigliucci https://philpapers.org/rec/BOUTFT
Twitter @waldenpod
Transcript https://emersongreenblog.wordpress.com/2022/04/21/logical-fallacies/
/ Counter Apologetics /
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Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/counter-apologetics/id1273573417
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0xp05xgyg04BWh0U1tCZ0z
/ Walden Pod /
Consider supporting at https://www.patreon.com/waldenpod
Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/walden-pod/id1474408172
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5It3kjkrB9CTDen1Sx3aGl?si=fZ6MENZ4TdSLDPLAJ_6dAA&nd=1
/ Timestamps /
00:00 Introduction & the Big Picture
05:31 Post hoc ergo propter hoc
07:36 ad hominem
16:36 ad populum
19:19 Begging the question
23:27 Conclusion Why I dont care about logical fallacies [Full Podcast Episode]](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/p4wDWMzvkA0/mqdefault.jpg)


