Uploaded February 2021 | Updated September 2026, 4 hours ago
What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? I argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. I begin by discussing why disagreement has motivated many to say philosophers cannot rationally believe their theories, and I explain why the argument from disagreement does not ultimately establish this. Then, I motivate my view in three ways: the first concerns roles for belief and credence, the second provides other cases of rational belief and middling to low credence, and the final explains why believing one’s philosophical theories is superior to endorsing them. I close by discussing implications my view has for the Lockean thesis, the view that there is an important connection between rational belief and rational credence.
I presented this paper in the "Belief and Credence" session at the 2021 Eastern Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.
Handout available here: liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/APA-handout.pdf
0:00 Talk
33:55 Q&A
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Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophy
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: @lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? I argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. I begin by discussing why disagreement has motivated many to say philosophers cannot rationally believe their theories, and I explain why the argument from disagreement does not ultimately establish this. Then, I motivate my view in three ways: the first concerns roles for belief and credence, the second provides other cases of rational belief and middling to low credence, and the final explains why believing one’s philosophical theories is superior to endorsing them. I close by discussing implications my view has for the Lockean thesis, the view that there is an important connection between rational belief and rational credence.
I presented this paper in the "Belief and Credence" session at the 2021 Eastern Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.
Handout available here: liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/APA-handout.pdf
0:00 Talk
33:55 Q&A
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Check out my website: liz-jackson.com
For more on my research: liz-jackson.com/research
For popular-level interviews, podcasts, and blog posts I’ve done: liz-jackson.com/public-philosophy
Follow me on social media:
Twitter: twitter.com/lizjackson111
Instagram: @lizjackson111
Facebook: facebook.com/lizjackson111
