Uploaded November 2026 | Updated November 2026, 17 hours ago
Astute with SCI Semiconductor presents CHERI-based hardware memory protection for embedded systems and processor platforms. Applications Engineering Technical BDM Andrew Parker explains how capabilities separate pointers from memory and use bounds, permissions, sealing, and compartments to constrain software access. astute.co.uk
The approach targets memory safety issues such as buffer overflows, pointer manipulation, and malware injection. Rather than relying only on software patches, the CHERI model enforces protection in hardware, with software compiled using a CHERI compiler for the RISC-V architecture described in the demonstration.
Compartmentalization limits the impact of a fault or attack: applications can be isolated from one another, and a compromised compartment can be reset without taking down the rest of the system. Parker describes a product range spanning 32-bit microcontroller units for embedded uses such as motor control, through to multicore processing environments.
The demonstration uses a Raspberry Pi as a server representing a rail network and an embedded controller managing a sign. A simulated memory overflow disrupts the sign’s network connection; the connection is restored, the server sends updated output, and the rest of the display remains operational. The demo illustrates recovery and containment within the affected compartment.
Parker distinguishes CHERI for core processing environments from CHERI-Eats IoT for edge devices, and connects hardware-enforced memory safety to the Cyber Resilience Act. The discussion focuses on how capability-based protection can be applied across embedded controllers and larger systems.
Astute with SCI Semiconductor presents CHERI-based hardware memory protection for embedded systems and processor platforms. Applications Engineering Technical BDM Andrew Parker explains how capabilities separate pointers from memory and use bounds, permissions, sealing, and compartments to constrain software access. astute.co.uk
The approach targets memory safety issues such as buffer overflows, pointer manipulation, and malware injection. Rather than relying only on software patches, the CHERI model enforces protection in hardware, with software compiled using a CHERI compiler for the RISC-V architecture described in the demonstration.
Compartmentalization limits the impact of a fault or attack: applications can be isolated from one another, and a compromised compartment can be reset without taking down the rest of the system. Parker describes a product range spanning 32-bit microcontroller units for embedded uses such as motor control, through to multicore processing environments.
The demonstration uses a Raspberry Pi as a server representing a rail network and an embedded controller managing a sign. A simulated memory overflow disrupts the sign’s network connection; the connection is restored, the server sends updated output, and the rest of the display remains operational. The demo illustrates recovery and containment within the affected compartment.
Parker distinguishes CHERI for core processing environments from CHERI-Eats IoT for edge devices, and connects hardware-enforced memory safety to the Cyber Resilience Act. The discussion focuses on how capability-based protection can be applied across embedded controllers and larger systems.










