Uploaded May 2026 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
The contrast between American and European nuclear policy could not be starker. It is perhaps the most active period in nuclear energy development in our lifetimes. But will the public—and the legal system—still react radioactively to the subject? What are the legal and regulatory obstacles to expanding alternate energy capacity, and how have they changed after the Supreme Court’s Diamond Alternative Energy case? What are the promises and perils of microreactors? And does the NRC lack the authority to license them, as several states claim in a pending lawsuit?
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.
The contrast between American and European nuclear policy could not be starker. It is perhaps the most active period in nuclear energy development in our lifetimes. But will the public—and the legal system—still react radioactively to the subject? What are the legal and regulatory obstacles to expanding alternate energy capacity, and how have they changed after the Supreme Court’s Diamond Alternative Energy case? What are the promises and perils of microreactors? And does the NRC lack the authority to license them, as several states claim in a pending lawsuit?
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.
![[LIVE] Originalism and State Constitutions](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/iZFvV6XJQ4s/mqdefault.jpg "[LIVE] Originalism and State Constitutions
Originalism has quickly become the leading approach to interpreting the U.S. Constitution, drawing from the work of Justice Antonin Scalia and others over the past three decades. But what place does originalism have in the states?
State constitutions often contain unique provisions that have no federal analogue. Take Alaskas unique constitutional provision empowering grand juries to investigate matters of public welfare and safety and to issue reports. This power falls outside the traditional role grand juries play and raises interesting questions. Recent scholarship published by the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy explores the text, history, and tradition behind this provision, offering a window into how originalism might operate differently at the state level.
What lessons can be drawn about the similarities between originalist interpretation of state constitutions and the federal constitution? Does originalism look different from state to state and between state and federal governments? How might judges and scholars take up the originalist mantle and shed light on other underexplored state constitutional provisions? Join our panel of experts as they explore how originalism is playing out in the states.
Featuring:
• Dr. Nicholas Cole, Senior Research Fellow, Pembroke College, University of Oxford; Director, the Quill Project
• Hon. Stephen Cox, Attorney General, Alaska
• Prof. Richard Garnett, Paul J. Schierl Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School
• Savannah Shoffner, J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School
• (Moderator) Hon. John D. Couriel, Justice, Florida Supreme Court
• (Introducer) Sean-Michael Pigeon, Editor-in-Chief, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Register for the live webinar at https://fedsoc.org/events/originalism-and-state-constitutions
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.")
![[LIVE] From Pork Producers to Suncor: Extraterritoriality and Our Constitutional Structure](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/m5fyrgam8DM/mqdefault.jpg "[LIVE] From Pork Producers to Suncor: Extraterritoriality and Our Constitutional Structure
How far can states go in regulating conduct that has effects outside their borders?
At the Founding, the states entered a constitutional union in part because the Articles of Confederation proved incapable of managing interstate conflicts and preventing individual states from imposing burdens on their neighbors. At the same time, many of the Framers grew concerned that unchecked state legislatures, driven by local interests and factional pressures, threatened both individual rights and the stability of the Union. The Constitution created a framework designed to preserve both state sovereignty and a functioning union. Today, some commentators argue that climate litigation presents a modern version of those same concerns.
In a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, Colorado local governments are seeking massive financial damages under state tort law for global climate-related harms.
Supporters of the energy companies contend that climate regulation is an inherently national and international issue, and therefore cannot be governed through a patchwork of state tort regimes or localized litigation. On the other side, the local governments argue that these suits involve traditional exercises of state police power–including nuisance, fraud, and consumer-protection law. While proponents frame these suits as localized consumer-protection disputes, critics argue they represent a dangerous breakdown of our constitutional architecture.
Notably, many of the amicus briefs filed in Suncor frame the dispute not merely as a question of statutory preemption, but as a broader debate over the structural Constitution itself—including the proper allocation of authority among Congress, courts, and the states. Is this case an example of the Constitution imposing structural limits to prevent individual states from effectively regulating the nation through litigation? Or does it embody the principle that states retain broad sovereign authority absent clear federal displacement? And what does the structural Constitution require of Congress, courts, and the states in resolving those conflicts?
More broadly, what are the constitutional limits on states regulations that impact activities outside their borders and what is the source for those limits? Three years ago, the Supreme Court made clear in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross that such restrictions are not found in the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Does the structural Constitution answer that question, or is the answer found in one or more particular provisions of the Constitution?
Join us for a discussion examining these questions.
Featuring:
• Prof. Michael Greve, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
• Prof. Daniel Rodriguez, Harold Washington Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law
• O.H. Skinner, Executive Director, Alliance For Consumers
• Michael Williams, Solicitor General, West Virginia
• (Moderator) Hon. Jennifer Perkins, Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Register for the live webinar at https://fedsoc.org/events/from-pork-producers-to-suncor-extraterritoriality-and-our-constitutional-structure
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.")
