Uploaded July 2026 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
The government-speech doctrine generally permits the government to select and promote its own messages without being subject to First Amendment scrutiny. But does that principle have limits? What about when public funds, facilities, or employees are used to convey partisan messages or selectively promote particular viewpoints?
Join us for a discussion on whether and to what extent the First Amendment constrains the government’s own speech.
Featuring:
Erik S. Jaffe, Partner, Schaerr | Jaffe LLP
Prof. Eugene Volokh, Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law
[Moderator] Hon. Susanna Dokupil, Justice, Texas First Court of Appeals
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.
The government-speech doctrine generally permits the government to select and promote its own messages without being subject to First Amendment scrutiny. But does that principle have limits? What about when public funds, facilities, or employees are used to convey partisan messages or selectively promote particular viewpoints?
Join us for a discussion on whether and to what extent the First Amendment constrains the government’s own speech.
Featuring:
Erik S. Jaffe, Partner, Schaerr | Jaffe LLP
Prof. Eugene Volokh, Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law
[Moderator] Hon. Susanna Dokupil, Justice, Texas First Court of Appeals
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.
![[LIVE] From Pork Producers to Suncor: Extraterritoriality and Our Constitutional Structure](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/m5fyrgam8DM/mqdefault.jpg "[LIVE] From Pork Producers to Suncor: Extraterritoriality and Our Constitutional Structure
How far can states go in regulating conduct that has effects outside their borders?
At the Founding, the states entered a constitutional union in part because the Articles of Confederation proved incapable of managing interstate conflicts and preventing individual states from imposing burdens on their neighbors. At the same time, many of the Framers grew concerned that unchecked state legislatures, driven by local interests and factional pressures, threatened both individual rights and the stability of the Union. The Constitution created a framework designed to preserve both state sovereignty and a functioning union. Today, some commentators argue that climate litigation presents a modern version of those same concerns.
In a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, Colorado local governments are seeking massive financial damages under state tort law for global climate-related harms.
Supporters of the energy companies contend that climate regulation is an inherently national and international issue, and therefore cannot be governed through a patchwork of state tort regimes or localized litigation. On the other side, the local governments argue that these suits involve traditional exercises of state police power–including nuisance, fraud, and consumer-protection law. While proponents frame these suits as localized consumer-protection disputes, critics argue they represent a dangerous breakdown of our constitutional architecture.
Notably, many of the amicus briefs filed in Suncor frame the dispute not merely as a question of statutory preemption, but as a broader debate over the structural Constitution itself—including the proper allocation of authority among Congress, courts, and the states. Is this case an example of the Constitution imposing structural limits to prevent individual states from effectively regulating the nation through litigation? Or does it embody the principle that states retain broad sovereign authority absent clear federal displacement? And what does the structural Constitution require of Congress, courts, and the states in resolving those conflicts?
More broadly, what are the constitutional limits on states regulations that impact activities outside their borders and what is the source for those limits? Three years ago, the Supreme Court made clear in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross that such restrictions are not found in the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Does the structural Constitution answer that question, or is the answer found in one or more particular provisions of the Constitution?
Join us for a discussion examining these questions.
Featuring:
• Prof. Michael Greve, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
• Prof. Daniel Rodriguez, Harold Washington Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law
• O.H. Skinner, Executive Director, Alliance For Consumers
• Michael Williams, Solicitor General, West Virginia
• (Moderator) Hon. Jennifer Perkins, Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Register for the live webinar at https://fedsoc.org/events/from-pork-producers-to-suncor-extraterritoriality-and-our-constitutional-structure
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.")
![[LIVE] What Was an Establishment of Religion at the Founding?](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/nVaBKoBRuJQ/mqdefault.jpg "[LIVE] What Was an Establishment of Religion at the Founding?
In this Federalist Society America250 series, experts analyze modern legal and policy debates through the lens of the Founding generation. The Founders gave us the tools to answer many contemporary questions; join us as we explore those answers.
In 2022, the Supreme Court overruled the Lemon Test for interpreting the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, holding that the Clause must instead be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings. To do this, the Court suggested it would look to certain historical hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment. This has kicked off a vigorous debate, in both caselaw and scholarship, about what constituted an establishment of religion at the time of the Founding, and how that history should inform interpretation of the Establishment Clause today.
Join a gathering of the foremost scholars and litigators of the Establishment Clause to discuss the Clauses historical meaning both as a matter of originalist theory and in its application to current church-state controversies, such as displays of the Ten Commandments in public schools.
Featuring:
• Joe Davis, Senior Counsel, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
• Douglas Laycock, Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Virginia; Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Texas
• Michael McConnell, Richard and Frances Mallery Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
• (Moderator) Hon. Ryan D. Nelson, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Register for the live webinar at https://fedsoc.org/events/what-was-an-establishment-of-religion-at-the-founding
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As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.")
