Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 5 days ago
Three years ago this week, Hamas launched an invasion that Israel’s own intelligence services considered essentially impossible. Elliot Kaufman’s new book, In the War Room, explains why that confidence was misplaced, and just how close Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar came to succeeding.
Kaufman spent the better part of the last two years reporting on this war for the Wall Street Journal, and his book pulls from documents recovered from Hamas along with direct access to Israel’s top political, military, and intelligence leadership. I asked him why Hamas launched the attack when it did. His answer: It was the opening move of a plan to destroy Israel entirely, one that depended on Hezbollah joining within days with a missile arsenal capable of leveling Haifa and crippling Israel’s power grid. That never happened, and Kaufman traces the failure back to one man, Hassan Nasrallah, and a single moment of caution that changed the course of the war.
I also asked him about the viral Haaretz report claiming Netanyahu ignored specific warnings from the United Arab Emirates, and that Sinwar attacked partly out of frustration over a stalled economic deal with Israel. Kaufman didn’t dismiss it outright. Some of it holds up—Israeli intelligence did receive warnings, just not in the form or specificity the article suggests. But he pushes back on the deeper implication: that this was a failure of warnings rather than a failure of imagination. Israel had plenty of red flags; what it lacked was the ability to believe Hamas would actually act on them.
We spent real time on the internal Israeli story. Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and opposition leader Benny Gantz ran this war while, by Kaufman’s account, detesting one another personally, refusing each other’s calls, and banning each other’s aides from meetings. That dysfunction shaped real decisions, including the early argument over whether to strike Hezbollah first while Israel still had surprise on its side, or focus on Gaza. Kaufman thinks Israel made the wrong call—the three-week gap before troops entered Gaza gave the international media time to turn against Israel, a window he argues never closed.
We also got into what he considers the single biggest unforced error of the war—a two-month stretch when Israel cut off aid to pressure Hamas into a hostage deal, a decision that backfired badly and fed a global narrative about famine in Gaza that Kaufman argues never held up to scrutiny. By the end, we zoomed out to the bigger picture. Hamas set out to destroy Israel, but instead, Hezbollah lost its missile arsenal, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria collapsed, and Iran’s nuclear program sits in rubble under a U.S. naval blockade. Every domino Sinwar knocked over on October 7 ended up falling against him.
bookshop.org/p/books/in-the-war-room-the-inside-story-of-israel-s-fight-against-hamas-and-the-iranian-axis-elliot-kaufman/4cf4cd5e88222bda?ean=9798895654804&affiliate=93116
The Free Press earns a commission from any purchases made through all book links in this article.
0:00 Intro
3:37 Why Hamas Invaded Israel on October 7th
7:39 The Haaretz Claims About Netanyahu and Sinwar
11:08 Why Sinwar Believed He Could Destroy Israel
14:18 Sinwar's Miscalculation With Hezbollah
16:37 Why Israeli Intelligence Was Strong on Hezbollah but Blind on Hamas
21:36 The Charge That Netanyahu Propped Up Hamas
29:00 The Decision to Fight Hamas First Instead of Hezbollah
33:26 Was a More Targeted War Against October 7th's Perpetrators Possible
41:48 The Unforced Error of Cutting Off Aid to Gaza
48:48 What Was Hamas's Actual Strategy
55:24 How the Jihadist Worldview Erased the Line Between Civilian and Combatant
1:01:38 The Conflict Between Rescuing Hostages and Destroying Hamas
1:07:43 Was Netanyahu Right and Galant Wrong
1:13:27 Who Is Benny Gantz
1:18:09 The Role of the Far Right in the War
1:23:51 The War's Effect on the Prospect of a Two-State Solution
1:28:38 The War's Effect on the US-Israel Relationship
1:34:16 The War's Effect on the Abraham Accords
Three years ago this week, Hamas launched an invasion that Israel’s own intelligence services considered essentially impossible. Elliot Kaufman’s new book, In the War Room, explains why that confidence was misplaced, and just how close Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar came to succeeding.
Kaufman spent the better part of the last two years reporting on this war for the Wall Street Journal, and his book pulls from documents recovered from Hamas along with direct access to Israel’s top political, military, and intelligence leadership. I asked him why Hamas launched the attack when it did. His answer: It was the opening move of a plan to destroy Israel entirely, one that depended on Hezbollah joining within days with a missile arsenal capable of leveling Haifa and crippling Israel’s power grid. That never happened, and Kaufman traces the failure back to one man, Hassan Nasrallah, and a single moment of caution that changed the course of the war.
I also asked him about the viral Haaretz report claiming Netanyahu ignored specific warnings from the United Arab Emirates, and that Sinwar attacked partly out of frustration over a stalled economic deal with Israel. Kaufman didn’t dismiss it outright. Some of it holds up—Israeli intelligence did receive warnings, just not in the form or specificity the article suggests. But he pushes back on the deeper implication: that this was a failure of warnings rather than a failure of imagination. Israel had plenty of red flags; what it lacked was the ability to believe Hamas would actually act on them.
We spent real time on the internal Israeli story. Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and opposition leader Benny Gantz ran this war while, by Kaufman’s account, detesting one another personally, refusing each other’s calls, and banning each other’s aides from meetings. That dysfunction shaped real decisions, including the early argument over whether to strike Hezbollah first while Israel still had surprise on its side, or focus on Gaza. Kaufman thinks Israel made the wrong call—the three-week gap before troops entered Gaza gave the international media time to turn against Israel, a window he argues never closed.
We also got into what he considers the single biggest unforced error of the war—a two-month stretch when Israel cut off aid to pressure Hamas into a hostage deal, a decision that backfired badly and fed a global narrative about famine in Gaza that Kaufman argues never held up to scrutiny. By the end, we zoomed out to the bigger picture. Hamas set out to destroy Israel, but instead, Hezbollah lost its missile arsenal, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria collapsed, and Iran’s nuclear program sits in rubble under a U.S. naval blockade. Every domino Sinwar knocked over on October 7 ended up falling against him.
bookshop.org/p/books/in-the-war-room-the-inside-story-of-israel-s-fight-against-hamas-and-the-iranian-axis-elliot-kaufman/4cf4cd5e88222bda?ean=9798895654804&affiliate=93116
The Free Press earns a commission from any purchases made through all book links in this article.
0:00 Intro
3:37 Why Hamas Invaded Israel on October 7th
7:39 The Haaretz Claims About Netanyahu and Sinwar
11:08 Why Sinwar Believed He Could Destroy Israel
14:18 Sinwar's Miscalculation With Hezbollah
16:37 Why Israeli Intelligence Was Strong on Hezbollah but Blind on Hamas
21:36 The Charge That Netanyahu Propped Up Hamas
29:00 The Decision to Fight Hamas First Instead of Hezbollah
33:26 Was a More Targeted War Against October 7th's Perpetrators Possible
41:48 The Unforced Error of Cutting Off Aid to Gaza
48:48 What Was Hamas's Actual Strategy
55:24 How the Jihadist Worldview Erased the Line Between Civilian and Combatant
1:01:38 The Conflict Between Rescuing Hostages and Destroying Hamas
1:07:43 Was Netanyahu Right and Galant Wrong
1:13:27 Who Is Benny Gantz
1:18:09 The Role of the Far Right in the War
1:23:51 The War's Effect on the Prospect of a Two-State Solution
1:28:38 The War's Effect on the US-Israel Relationship
1:34:16 The War's Effect on the Abraham Accords









![Inside the Mind of Donald Trump with H.R. McMaster
[RECORDED PRIOR TO INAUGURATION DAY]
In this conversation, I interview H.R. McMaster, discussing Americas role in the world, the military-industrial complex, the concept of a deep state, bureaucratic resistance, lessons from the Vietnam War, and the strengths and weaknesses of Donald Trump as a leader. McMaster was Trumps National Security Adviser during 2017 and part of 2018. He emphasizes the importance of engagement in foreign policy, critiques the notion of a military-industrial complex, and reflects on the challenges of navigating bureaucratic inertia in Washington. He also shares insights on Trumps personality and decision-making style, particularly regarding NATO and South Korea. In this conversation, McMaster discusses the current geopolitical landscape, focusing on the implications of U.S. foreign policy under Trump and Biden. He highlights the urgency of addressing threats from North Korea, China, and Russia, while also evaluating the effectiveness of the Biden administrations strategies. McMaster emphasizes the fragility of authoritarian regimes and the importance of a strong U.S. response to global challenges. He also shares insights on key figures in Trumps potential administration and critiques the medias role in shaping public perception.
00:00 Americas Role in the World
05:50 Understanding the Deep State
12:02 Lessons from Vietnam
17:49 NATO and South Korea Dynamics
33:22 Geopolitical Tensions and International Trade
41:23 Evaluating Bidens China Strategy
48:12 Bidens Response to Russia and Ukraine
58:51 Key Figures in Trumps Administration Inside the Mind of Donald Trump with H.R. McMaster](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/jz1ZiHGRJao/mqdefault.jpg)
