Uploaded November 2025 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
Several Indian religious traditions associated with Vedānta offer conflicting descriptions of the ultimate reality, Brahman. A prominent example is found in the Bhedābheda Vedānta tradition, which posits that Brahman is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this appears to be a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda Vedānta thinkers, such as Bhaskara (8th-9th Century), Nimbārka (13th Century?), and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th Century), attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct sense of “difference.” A notable exception is Jīva Gosvāmī, a leading theologian of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava school (15th century). According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction directly, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). He termed his school Acintya Bhedābheda. Despite textual evidence supporting this view, other evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests that his theology might be reconstructed using a more traditional, contradiction-avoiding approach. This raises fascinating theological issues. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while remaining faithful to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as (a) Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and (weakly) dialetheic account of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta theology.
Several Indian religious traditions associated with Vedānta offer conflicting descriptions of the ultimate reality, Brahman. A prominent example is found in the Bhedābheda Vedānta tradition, which posits that Brahman is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this appears to be a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda Vedānta thinkers, such as Bhaskara (8th-9th Century), Nimbārka (13th Century?), and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th Century), attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct sense of “difference.” A notable exception is Jīva Gosvāmī, a leading theologian of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava school (15th century). According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction directly, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). He termed his school Acintya Bhedābheda. Despite textual evidence supporting this view, other evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests that his theology might be reconstructed using a more traditional, contradiction-avoiding approach. This raises fascinating theological issues. The purpose of this paper is to provide an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while remaining faithful to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as (a) Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and (weakly) dialetheic account of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta theology.
