Uploaded July 2009 | Updated September 2026, 3 weeks ago
This is a followup to my video in which I suggest we sponsor 5000 poor Iranians a year to go on a Hajj. This is a peace offering intended as part of an apology for our role in overthrowing Mossadegh and putting the Shah back on the thrown. However, this offer comes with a twist that turns it from a rose of appeasement into a dagger aimed at the heart of the Iranian regime.
youtube.com/watch?v=N-sL63xBZo8
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Lamont v. Woods (Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 1991)
openjurist.org/948/f2d/825
Here are the key passages from Lamont v. Wood that address this issue (citations omitted):
In our view, domestic Establishment Clause jurisprudence has more than enough flexibility to accommodate any special circumstances created by the foreign situs of the expenditures, although the international dimension does, we believe, enter into the analysis.
Whether governmental action violates the Establishment Clause depends on whether it has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive government entanglement with religion.. As Judge Sand observed, the ASHA program has the legitimate secular purpose of assisting foreign schools that teach American ideas and practices. The focus of the debate in this case is therefore on the primary-effect and excessive-entanglement questions. Because the former question will likely be critical on remand, we offer the following guidance for the district court.
. . .While the analytical shortcut provided by the pervasively sectarian test may generally be appropriate, it should not be mechanically applied in every case. As the Supreme Court cautioned . . . every Establishment Clause challenge calls for "line-drawing," and "no fixed, per se rule can be framed":
The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application.... The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test. The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."
Given the possible foreign policy ramifications of invalidating grants under the ASHA program, it would be particularly inappropriate to adopt a mechanical approach in this case . Therefore, in our view, once it has been determined that a particular ASHA grantee is pervasively sectarian, the government should be permitted to demonstrate some compelling reason why the usually unacceptable risk attendant on funding such an institution should, in the particular case, be borne. For example, the fact that a particular grantee is, as a practical matter, the only channel for aid, or that a given country has no secular educational system at all, may warrant overriding the usual Establishment Clause presumption. The court would then scrutinize the manner in which the institution may use its grant in an attempt to ascertain whether, in reality, the grant would have the principal or primary effect of advancing religion.
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Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid, JESSICA POWLEY HAYDEN, The Georgetown Law Journal, v.95:17
georgetownlawjournal.com/issues/pdf/95-1/hayden.pdf%5B1%5D.pdf
(Note: this article won the Burton Award for Legal Achievement)
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/June.5.2007.html
The key point from Haydens paper:
If the court finds that the use of U.S. funds to promote a certain program infringes the Establishment Clause and would be unconstitutional within the United States, this need not mean it would automatically find the program unconstitutional. Instead, the court could employ a balancing analysis (much like that suggested in Lamont) to determine if the program should be upheld. First, the court should determine if there is a compelling national security interest. Second, assuming that the national security interest is compelling, the program should be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling government interest.
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For a transcript of this video see:
themaskedanalyst.com/VideoTranscripts/Followup%20to%20Obamas%20Iran%20speach.htm
This is a followup to my video in which I suggest we sponsor 5000 poor Iranians a year to go on a Hajj. This is a peace offering intended as part of an apology for our role in overthrowing Mossadegh and putting the Shah back on the thrown. However, this offer comes with a twist that turns it from a rose of appeasement into a dagger aimed at the heart of the Iranian regime.
youtube.com/watch?v=N-sL63xBZo8
-----------------------
Lamont v. Woods (Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 1991)
openjurist.org/948/f2d/825
Here are the key passages from Lamont v. Wood that address this issue (citations omitted):
In our view, domestic Establishment Clause jurisprudence has more than enough flexibility to accommodate any special circumstances created by the foreign situs of the expenditures, although the international dimension does, we believe, enter into the analysis.
Whether governmental action violates the Establishment Clause depends on whether it has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive government entanglement with religion.. As Judge Sand observed, the ASHA program has the legitimate secular purpose of assisting foreign schools that teach American ideas and practices. The focus of the debate in this case is therefore on the primary-effect and excessive-entanglement questions. Because the former question will likely be critical on remand, we offer the following guidance for the district court.
. . .While the analytical shortcut provided by the pervasively sectarian test may generally be appropriate, it should not be mechanically applied in every case. As the Supreme Court cautioned . . . every Establishment Clause challenge calls for "line-drawing," and "no fixed, per se rule can be framed":
The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application.... The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test. The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."
Given the possible foreign policy ramifications of invalidating grants under the ASHA program, it would be particularly inappropriate to adopt a mechanical approach in this case . Therefore, in our view, once it has been determined that a particular ASHA grantee is pervasively sectarian, the government should be permitted to demonstrate some compelling reason why the usually unacceptable risk attendant on funding such an institution should, in the particular case, be borne. For example, the fact that a particular grantee is, as a practical matter, the only channel for aid, or that a given country has no secular educational system at all, may warrant overriding the usual Establishment Clause presumption. The court would then scrutinize the manner in which the institution may use its grant in an attempt to ascertain whether, in reality, the grant would have the principal or primary effect of advancing religion.
------------------------
Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid, JESSICA POWLEY HAYDEN, The Georgetown Law Journal, v.95:17
georgetownlawjournal.com/issues/pdf/95-1/hayden.pdf%5B1%5D.pdf
(Note: this article won the Burton Award for Legal Achievement)
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/June.5.2007.html
The key point from Haydens paper:
If the court finds that the use of U.S. funds to promote a certain program infringes the Establishment Clause and would be unconstitutional within the United States, this need not mean it would automatically find the program unconstitutional. Instead, the court could employ a balancing analysis (much like that suggested in Lamont) to determine if the program should be upheld. First, the court should determine if there is a compelling national security interest. Second, assuming that the national security interest is compelling, the program should be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling government interest.
------------------------
For a transcript of this video see:
themaskedanalyst.com/VideoTranscripts/Followup%20to%20Obamas%20Iran%20speach.htm



![Blunty3000, Utubedrama, and Censorship: Part 2
This video provides a detailed response to Blunty3000 and his support of the censorship of haters. The issue is not as simple as Blunty suggests, and legitimate free speech could be the inadvertent casualty of an anti-hater campaign. Such a campaign could also backfire and severely hurt Youtube.
Here is a link to Blunty3000s video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWG-zgaXH40
Bluntys blog where he discusses haters in general and Trevor Rieger in specific:
http://www.bluntmation.com/content/
Utubedramaqueens video, where Trevor describes why he thinks Youtube censored him:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEojLdCxDQo
Information about Richard Nixons enemies list:
http://www.answers.com/topic/nixon-s-enemies-list
Michelle Malkins First They Came video.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOb6Vh3qaAY
New York Times v. Sullivan—The seminal libel law case.
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/comm/free_speech/nytvsullivan.html
The original passage from NYT v. Sullivan that I bent to fit this situation:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount leads to a comparable self-censorship. Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. [note 19] Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A. 6th Cir. 1893); see also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col.L.Rev. 875, 892 (1949). Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which steer far wider of the unlawful zone. Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. at 526. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
My video discussing the Nick Gisburne affair. Nick was originally told by Youtube that he was being censored for inappropriate content. Youtube later told him that he was being banned forever because of copyright infringement.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=By6aqz_79Uc
Youtubes bungling of the Gisburne affair earned it some really bad press. Watch Michelle Malkins video and pay close attention to the comments underneath it.
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/02/21/banned-by-youtube-iii/
This video by Ron, the Washington, D.C. copyright lawyer, discusses the Tur v. Youtube lawsuit. It is absolutely essential to watch this video for people to understand why Youtube should be careful not to get a reputation for censorship.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rr9SQ4qkMMk
Update: Trevors Utubedramaqueen account has been banished and he is now posting as Utubedramaking.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUUEczUFCsg Blunty3000, Utubedrama, and Censorship: Part 2](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/bjcsNRpa4jY/mqdefault.jpg)






