Uploaded September 2013 | Updated September 2026, 1 day ago
"I think you represented what I wrote about the BGV theorem in my papers and to you personally very accurately." - Alexander Vilenkin's e-mail to William Lane Craig, dated September 6, 2013
In their debate in Australia (2013), Lawrence Krauss accused William Lane Craig of misrepresenting Alexander Vilenkin and the BGV Theorem. To prove his point Krauss presented his private e-mail from Vilenkin. However, Craig noticed a number of ellipsis in the e-mail and wanted to know what Krauss deleted. Krauss said he deleted portions of the e-mail because they were "technical." Guess what? Vilenkin's uncensored e-mail to Krauss has been made public and it paints a different picture than the one Krauss presented. Here's the uncensored e-mail from Vilenkin to Krauss:
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Hi Lawrence,
Any theorem is only as good as its assumptions. The BGV theorem says that if the universe is on average expanding along a given worldline, this worldline cannot be infinite to the past.
A possible loophole is that there might be an epoch of contraction prior to the expansion. Models of this sort have been discussed by Aguirre & Gratton and by Carroll & Chen. They had to assume though that the minimum of entropy was reached at the bounce and offered no mechanism to enforce this condition. It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning.
On the other hand, Jaume Garriga and I are now exploring a picture of the multiverse where the BGV theorem may not apply. In bubbles of negative vacuum energy, expansion is followed by cocntraction, and it is usually assumed that this ends in a big crunch singularity. However, it is conceivable (and many people think likely) that singularities will be resolved in the theory of quantum gravity, so the internal collapse of the bubbles will be followed by an expansion. In this scenario, a typical worldline will go through a succession of expanding and contracting regions, and it is not at all clear that the BGV assumption (expansion on average) will be satisfied.
I suspect that the theorem can be extended to this case, maybe with some additional assumptions. But of course there is no such thing as absolute certainty in science, especially in matters like the creation of the universe. Note for example that the BGV theorem uses a classical picture of spacetime. In the regime where gravity becomes essentially quantum, we may not even know the right questions to ask.
Alex
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William Lane Craig's reaction to this uncensored e-mail:
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Whoa! That puts a very different face on the matter, doesn't it? Why didn't Krauss read the sentence, "It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning"? Because it was too technical? Is this the transparency, honesty, and forthrightness that Krauss extols? (By the way, Vilenkin's criticism of these models is the same one that Vilenkin makes in his Cambridge paper: far from showing an eternal past, these models actually feature a universe with a common beginning point for two arrows of time.)
And why did Krauss delete Vilenkin's caveat that the BGV theorem can, in his estimation, be extended to cover the case of an expanding and contracting model such as Garriga and Vilenkin are exploring? And why delete the remark that such a model is usually assumed to be incorrect? It's evident that Vilenkin's email was selectively edited to give it the spin Krauss wanted.
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Lawrence Krauss is in deep trouble for taking Vilenkin out of context like this. This proves Krauss is more interested in ideology than scientific evidence. This dishonesty shows he fails as a serious academic and leading thinker in physics and science. To read more on Lawrence Krauss' misuse of Alexander Vilenkin go here (this a must-read article!): reasonablefaith.org/honesty-transparency-full-disclosure-and-bgv-theorem
"I think you represented what I wrote about the BGV theorem in my papers and to you personally very accurately." - Alexander Vilenkin's e-mail to William Lane Craig, dated September 6, 2013
In their debate in Australia (2013), Lawrence Krauss accused William Lane Craig of misrepresenting Alexander Vilenkin and the BGV Theorem. To prove his point Krauss presented his private e-mail from Vilenkin. However, Craig noticed a number of ellipsis in the e-mail and wanted to know what Krauss deleted. Krauss said he deleted portions of the e-mail because they were "technical." Guess what? Vilenkin's uncensored e-mail to Krauss has been made public and it paints a different picture than the one Krauss presented. Here's the uncensored e-mail from Vilenkin to Krauss:
===========================
Hi Lawrence,
Any theorem is only as good as its assumptions. The BGV theorem says that if the universe is on average expanding along a given worldline, this worldline cannot be infinite to the past.
A possible loophole is that there might be an epoch of contraction prior to the expansion. Models of this sort have been discussed by Aguirre & Gratton and by Carroll & Chen. They had to assume though that the minimum of entropy was reached at the bounce and offered no mechanism to enforce this condition. It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning.
On the other hand, Jaume Garriga and I are now exploring a picture of the multiverse where the BGV theorem may not apply. In bubbles of negative vacuum energy, expansion is followed by cocntraction, and it is usually assumed that this ends in a big crunch singularity. However, it is conceivable (and many people think likely) that singularities will be resolved in the theory of quantum gravity, so the internal collapse of the bubbles will be followed by an expansion. In this scenario, a typical worldline will go through a succession of expanding and contracting regions, and it is not at all clear that the BGV assumption (expansion on average) will be satisfied.
I suspect that the theorem can be extended to this case, maybe with some additional assumptions. But of course there is no such thing as absolute certainty in science, especially in matters like the creation of the universe. Note for example that the BGV theorem uses a classical picture of spacetime. In the regime where gravity becomes essentially quantum, we may not even know the right questions to ask.
Alex
===========================
William Lane Craig's reaction to this uncensored e-mail:
===========================
Whoa! That puts a very different face on the matter, doesn't it? Why didn't Krauss read the sentence, "It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning"? Because it was too technical? Is this the transparency, honesty, and forthrightness that Krauss extols? (By the way, Vilenkin's criticism of these models is the same one that Vilenkin makes in his Cambridge paper: far from showing an eternal past, these models actually feature a universe with a common beginning point for two arrows of time.)
And why did Krauss delete Vilenkin's caveat that the BGV theorem can, in his estimation, be extended to cover the case of an expanding and contracting model such as Garriga and Vilenkin are exploring? And why delete the remark that such a model is usually assumed to be incorrect? It's evident that Vilenkin's email was selectively edited to give it the spin Krauss wanted.
===========================
Lawrence Krauss is in deep trouble for taking Vilenkin out of context like this. This proves Krauss is more interested in ideology than scientific evidence. This dishonesty shows he fails as a serious academic and leading thinker in physics and science. To read more on Lawrence Krauss' misuse of Alexander Vilenkin go here (this a must-read article!): reasonablefaith.org/honesty-transparency-full-disclosure-and-bgv-theorem
![Kalam Cosmological Argument - Douglas Groothuis, PhD
Doug Groothuis gives a lecture on the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Whats interesting about this lecture is that Groothuis did not accept the Kalam Cosmological Argument at first but was later convinced by it.
Notes:
http://www.relyonchrist.com/Lecture/13.htm
http://www.relyonchrist.com/Lecture/14.htm
Kalam Cosmological Argument
(Moreland, Scaling the Secular City; see also William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith [Crossway, 1994]; Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation from Nothing [Baker, 2004]; William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God: A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist [Oxford, 2004])
Preliminary: concepts of (a) the actual infinite and (b) the potential infinite
1. The universe had a beginning
2. The impossibility of the actual infinite (distinguish from potential infinite)
3. The impossibility of traversing an actual infinite (even if it exists); forming an actual infinite through successive addition, piece by piece...
4. Scientific confirmation from Big Bang cosmology (absolute origination). See also John Jefferson Davis, Genesis 1:1 and Big Bang Cosmology, in The Frontiers of Science and Faith (InterVarsity, 2002), 11 36; and Robert Jastrow, God and the Astronomers (revised ed., 1992).
5. Scientific confirmation from second law of thermodynamics.
6. Astronomer Fred Hoyle (who once advanced the steady state cosmology) argues against the universe being infinitely old in virtue of its hydrogen consumption. The argument can be stated as a modus tolens deduction (denying the consequent).
7. Can everything come from nothing without a cause? The pop theory (biting the metaphysical bullet)
8. Philosophical critique of everything from nothing...
9. God and time (see Greg Gansell, editor, God and Time: Four Views [InterVarsity, 2001])
10. Argument against an impersonal cause
11. Argument against God needing a cause (Bertrand Russell)
12. Quentin Smiths acceptance of Big Bang cosmology and denial of Gods existence.
13. Unitary: Ockhams razor
14. Incorrigible, inextinguishable (having existed, God cannot fail to exist)
15. Personal, volitional (personal explanation—R. Swinburne)
16. Omnipotent: nothing is a greater expenditure of power than exnihilating the entire cosmos. This is rational to hold, given the argument.
17. Supplies the necessary conditions for impeccable and omnipotent goodness: (1) - (4). Need (5) moral argument and (6) the Incarnation for the final necessary condition, which, with (1) - (4), make for necessary and sufficient conditions. Kalam Cosmological Argument - Douglas Groothuis, PhD](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/AsqEznikq6c/mqdefault.jpg)

![How NOT to Argue Against the Kalam Cosmological Argument - William Lane Craig, PhD
This is probably one of the most entertaining lectures [titled Objections So Bad I Couldnt Have Made Them Up (or, the Worlds Ten Worst Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument)] Dr. William Lane Craig has given. He deals with the top 10 worst objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Many of these arguments were made by unsophisticated and uneducated (at least uneducated in philosophy or science) people on the Internet and youtube. Heres the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the unvierse has a cause.
Heres the list of the worst objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument:
1. Craig says that he believes in God on the basis of the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit in his heart, not on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument. In fact, he says that even if the argument were refuted, he would still believe in God. This is blatant hypocrisy on Craigs part.
2. The kalam cosmological argument is question-begging. For the truth of the first premise presupposes the truth of the conclusion. Therefore the argument is an example of reasoning in a circle.
3. The argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. In the first premise cause means material cause, while in the conclusion it does not.
4. The first premise is based upon the fallacy of composition. It fallaciously infers that because everything in the universe has a acause, therefore the whole universe has a cause.
5. If the universe began to exist, then it must have come from nothing. That is quite plausible, since there are no constraints on nothing, and so nothing can do anything, including producing the universe.
6. Nothing ever begins to exist! For the material of which something consists precedes it. So it is not true that the universe began to exist.
7. The argument equivocates on begins to exist. In (1) it means to begin from a previous material state, but in (2) it means not from a material state.
8. The argument is logically self-contradictory. For it says that everything has a cause, yet concludes that there is a first uncaused cause..
9. The cause mentioned in the arguments conclusion is not different from nothing. For timelessness, changelessness, spacelessness, etc. are all purely negative attributions which are also true of nothingness. Thus, the argument might as well be taken to prove that the universe came into being from nothing.
10. (From Richard Dawkins:) If god is the terminator of an infinite regress, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts. How NOT to Argue Against the Kalam Cosmological Argument - William Lane Craig, PhD](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/BX1Nihh3KCY/mqdefault.jpg)







