Uploaded December 2024 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
The dual-use nature of modern bioscience and the significant financial resources available to many states make it challenging to prevent the development of biological weapons through traditional controls on materials or knowledge. To address this, NTI | bio has commissioned an essay collection focused on shaping incentives to disincentivize states from pursuing bioweapons capabilities—an area with far less developed discourse compared to nuclear deterrence.
This event highlights the importance of fostering rigorous policy discussions around preventing biological weapons proliferation. By exploring innovative solutions and encouraging a more analytical approach to complex global biosecurity challenges, the goal is to bridge theory and practical policy efforts to invigorate international efforts to reduce biological threats.
Read the full report at nti.org/bioweapons.
The dual-use nature of modern bioscience and the significant financial resources available to many states make it challenging to prevent the development of biological weapons through traditional controls on materials or knowledge. To address this, NTI | bio has commissioned an essay collection focused on shaping incentives to disincentivize states from pursuing bioweapons capabilities—an area with far less developed discourse compared to nuclear deterrence.
This event highlights the importance of fostering rigorous policy discussions around preventing biological weapons proliferation. By exploring innovative solutions and encouraging a more analytical approach to complex global biosecurity challenges, the goal is to bridge theory and practical policy efforts to invigorate international efforts to reduce biological threats.
Read the full report at nti.org/bioweapons.










