Air Crash Daily | Allegheny Airlines Flight 853 News Reports @AirCrashDaily | Uploaded September 2024 | Updated October 2024, 22 hours ago.
Accident Description:
instagram.com/p/CiSU_JdOIjf/?igsh=c3dpeWJqc2J4Z3dh
Photos Archive:
https://x.com/aircrashdaily/status/1568253955062530048?s=19
๐๐น๐น๐ฒ๐ด๐ต๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ด๐ฑ๐ฏ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Boston to St. Louis with stopovers in Baltimore, Cincinnati and Indianapolis. The flight was being operated by a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 (Reg. N988VJ) on ๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ต, ๐ญ๐ต๐ฒ๐ต.
Flight 853 departed Cincinnati at 15:15 local time. At 15:27, the Indianapolis approach controller advised, "Allegheny 853 roger, squawk ident heading 280 radar vector visual approach 31L." The flight acknowledged the vector and was then instructed to descend to 2,500 feet. The flight acknowledged at 15:27:29, "853 cleared down 2500 and report reaching." At the same time a Piper PA-28-140 (Reg. N7374J) was operating in the area on a solo training flight from Brookside Airpark to Bakalar AFB. The plane was on a VFR flight plan indicating a cruising altitude of 3,500 feet.
The pilot advised the Indianapolis Flight Service Station at 15:21 that he had departed Brookside, requesting activation of his flight plan. This was the last known communication with N7374J. The approach controller did not notice any conflicting traffic in the area of Flight 853. Yet both planes were on a converging course, with the DC-9 descending towards the altitude of the PA-28. At approximately 15:29 both planes collided. The horizontal stabilizer of the DC-9 broke off and the aircraft impacted the ground inverted, almost wings-level, in a nose-down attitude. The Piper broke up and crashed about 4500 feet from the DC-9.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The deficiencies in the collision avoidance capability of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system of the Federal Aviation Administration in a terminal area wherein there was mixed Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. The deficiencies included the inadequacy of the see-and-avoid concept under the circumstances of this case; the technical limitations of radar in detecting all aircraft; and the absence of Federal Aviation Regulations which would provide a system of adequate separation of mixed VFR and IFR traffic in terminal areas."
Accident Description:
instagram.com/p/CiSU_JdOIjf/?igsh=c3dpeWJqc2J4Z3dh
Photos Archive:
https://x.com/aircrashdaily/status/1568253955062530048?s=19
๐๐น๐น๐ฒ๐ด๐ต๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐๐ถ๐ฟ๐น๐ถ๐ป๐ฒ๐ ๐๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ต๐ ๐ด๐ฑ๐ฏ was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Boston to St. Louis with stopovers in Baltimore, Cincinnati and Indianapolis. The flight was being operated by a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 (Reg. N988VJ) on ๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐๐ฒ๐บ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ต, ๐ญ๐ต๐ฒ๐ต.
Flight 853 departed Cincinnati at 15:15 local time. At 15:27, the Indianapolis approach controller advised, "Allegheny 853 roger, squawk ident heading 280 radar vector visual approach 31L." The flight acknowledged the vector and was then instructed to descend to 2,500 feet. The flight acknowledged at 15:27:29, "853 cleared down 2500 and report reaching." At the same time a Piper PA-28-140 (Reg. N7374J) was operating in the area on a solo training flight from Brookside Airpark to Bakalar AFB. The plane was on a VFR flight plan indicating a cruising altitude of 3,500 feet.
The pilot advised the Indianapolis Flight Service Station at 15:21 that he had departed Brookside, requesting activation of his flight plan. This was the last known communication with N7374J. The approach controller did not notice any conflicting traffic in the area of Flight 853. Yet both planes were on a converging course, with the DC-9 descending towards the altitude of the PA-28. At approximately 15:29 both planes collided. The horizontal stabilizer of the DC-9 broke off and the aircraft impacted the ground inverted, almost wings-level, in a nose-down attitude. The Piper broke up and crashed about 4500 feet from the DC-9.
๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ:
"The deficiencies in the collision avoidance capability of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system of the Federal Aviation Administration in a terminal area wherein there was mixed Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. The deficiencies included the inadequacy of the see-and-avoid concept under the circumstances of this case; the technical limitations of radar in detecting all aircraft; and the absence of Federal Aviation Regulations which would provide a system of adequate separation of mixed VFR and IFR traffic in terminal areas."
