Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 5 days ago
USENIX Security '26 - Exploring Privacy Negotiation Strategies for Camera-Equipped Smart Home Devices in Airbnb
Zixin Wang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Sunyup Park, University of Maryland, College Park; Haojian Jin, University of California, San Diego; Yaxing Yao, Johns Hopkins University
Privacy conflicts among multiple users are prevalent in smart environments. To address such conflicts and mitigate the privacy concerns of bystanders, privacy negotiation has been proposed as a promising approach. Yet it remains unclear what makes such negotiations accessible to tenants. In this paper, using camera-equipped smart devices in Airbnb as a case, we explored different privacy negotiation strategies to shed light on future designs to support such actions. We developed 24 storyboards varying four factors, including device types (e.g., driveway camera, video conferencing device for TVs, smart display device), negotiation initiators (host vs. tenant), strategies (physical adjustment vs. monetary compensation), and outcomes (accepted vs. declined). Then, using a vignette survey study (N = 400), we find that device type and strategy significantly shape evaluations: physical adjustment was consistently preferred over monetary compensation, and driveway camera negotiations were evaluated more favorably than those involving indoor devices (video conferencing device for TVs, smart display device). We summarize design implications to support privacy negotiations.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
USENIX Security '26 - Exploring Privacy Negotiation Strategies for Camera-Equipped Smart Home Devices in Airbnb
Zixin Wang, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Sunyup Park, University of Maryland, College Park; Haojian Jin, University of California, San Diego; Yaxing Yao, Johns Hopkins University
Privacy conflicts among multiple users are prevalent in smart environments. To address such conflicts and mitigate the privacy concerns of bystanders, privacy negotiation has been proposed as a promising approach. Yet it remains unclear what makes such negotiations accessible to tenants. In this paper, using camera-equipped smart devices in Airbnb as a case, we explored different privacy negotiation strategies to shed light on future designs to support such actions. We developed 24 storyboards varying four factors, including device types (e.g., driveway camera, video conferencing device for TVs, smart display device), negotiation initiators (host vs. tenant), strategies (physical adjustment vs. monetary compensation), and outcomes (accepted vs. declined). Then, using a vignette survey study (N = 400), we find that device type and strategy significantly shape evaluations: physical adjustment was consistently preferred over monetary compensation, and driveway camera negotiations were evaluated more favorably than those involving indoor devices (video conferencing device for TVs, smart display device). We summarize design implications to support privacy negotiations.
View the full USENIX Security '26 program at usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
![USENIX Security 26 - PICS: Private Intersection over Committed (and reusable) Sets
USENIX Security 26 - PICS: Private Intersection over Committed (and reusable) Sets
Aarushi Goel, Rutgers University; Peihan Miao and Phuoc Van Long Pham, Brown University; Satvinder Singh, Purdue University
Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables two parties to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing any additional information. While maliciously secure PSI protocols prevent many attacks, adversaries can still exploit them by using inconsistent inputs across multiple sessions. This limitation stems from the definition of malicious security in secure multiparty computation, but is particularly problematic in PSI because: (1) real-world applications—such as Apples PSI protocol for CSAM detection and private contact discovery in messaging apps—often require multiple PSI executions over consistent inputs, and (2) the PSI functionality makes it relatively easy for adversaries to infer additional information.
We propose Private Intersection over Committed Sets (PICS), a new framework that enforces input consistency across multiple sessions via committed sets. Building on the state-of-the-art maliciously secure PSI framework (i.e., VOLE-PSI [EUROCRYPT 2021]), we present an efficient instantiation of PICS using lightweight cryptographic tools. Our protocol achieves strong receiver-side input consistency (i.e., the receiver uses the exact committed set) and weak sender-side input consistency (i.e., the sender cannot inject new elements into the committed set but can potentially use a subset of the committed set). We implement our protocol to demonstrate concrete efficiency. Compared to VOLE-PSI, our communication overhead is a small constant between 1.57 - 2.04× for set sizes between 216-224, and the total end-to-end running time overhead is 1.22 - 1.98× across various network settings.
View the full USENIX Security 26 program at https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions USENIX Security 26 - PICS: Private Intersection over Committed (and reusable) Sets](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/Q6rhdJr_J4M/mqdefault.jpg)









