Uploaded July 2025 | Updated November 2026, 3 days ago
Prof. Tim Elmo Feiten
Pennsylvania State University, USA
Tim Elmo Feiten is an interdisciplinary philosopher of science with a focus on the sciences of life, mind, and artificial intelligence. He uses the lens of embodied cognition to develop new readings of Jakob von Uexküll and Max Stirner, and to ask questions about art, science, technology, and society. Other research projects deal with public engagement with science, democratizing AI research, the status of LLMs, and methodological issues with computational modeling in the humanities and social sciences.
What if Uexküll Was Right? Facing the Ethnical and Metaphysical Implications of Umwelt
Jakob Johann von Uexküll’s admirers have almost all agreed on one point: denying Uexküll’s view that each human individual inhabits its own private Umwelt and can never access the Umwelten of other subjects. This position has been variously decried as solipsist, idealist, or relativist and criticized for its alleged ethical and metaphysical implications. I address the problem of the privacy of Umwelt by outlining two kinds of response: a straight and a skeptical solution. I argue that straight solutions are unlikely to succeed and suggest that the ethical and metaphysical outcomes of a skeptical solution are nothing to be afraid of.
Prof. Tim Elmo Feiten
Pennsylvania State University, USA
Tim Elmo Feiten is an interdisciplinary philosopher of science with a focus on the sciences of life, mind, and artificial intelligence. He uses the lens of embodied cognition to develop new readings of Jakob von Uexküll and Max Stirner, and to ask questions about art, science, technology, and society. Other research projects deal with public engagement with science, democratizing AI research, the status of LLMs, and methodological issues with computational modeling in the humanities and social sciences.
What if Uexküll Was Right? Facing the Ethnical and Metaphysical Implications of Umwelt
Jakob Johann von Uexküll’s admirers have almost all agreed on one point: denying Uexküll’s view that each human individual inhabits its own private Umwelt and can never access the Umwelten of other subjects. This position has been variously decried as solipsist, idealist, or relativist and criticized for its alleged ethical and metaphysical implications. I address the problem of the privacy of Umwelt by outlining two kinds of response: a straight and a skeptical solution. I argue that straight solutions are unlikely to succeed and suggest that the ethical and metaphysical outcomes of a skeptical solution are nothing to be afraid of.










