The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppes Specificity Principle @tvlpodcast
The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppes Specificity Principle  @tvlpodcast
Uploaded June 2026 | Updated November 2026, 3 hours ago
An AI narration of the article 'The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppe's Specificity Principle' by Jake Desyllas.

Do we have rights because of what we are, or because of some capacity we later acquire? Libertarians are split, and the stakes run straight through the hardest questions about children, abortion, and self-ownership. This episode tests the two rival theories against one of Hans-Hermann Hoppe's meta-ethical principles: that every property right must be specific about who holds it and when. Drawing on admissions from Tibor Machan, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Stephan Kinsella, it argues that the theory of acquired rights cannot say when a child becomes a self-owner, and so fails the test on its own terms. The theory of inherent rights, which locates the start of rights at conception, does not. A short, sharp piece on a meta-ethical principle with large consequences.

Chapters:

0:00 Introduction 2:25 The theory of acquired rights is not specific about when a child becomes a self owner 7:29 The Theory of Inherent Rights Conforms To The Specificity Principle

First published at jakedesyllas.com/blog/2025/1/21/the-theory-of-acquired-rights-violates-hoppes-specificity-principle on 21 January 2025.
The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppes Specificity Principle152 Your Own Moral Compass Part 2352 Value Investing160 Choice Conversations Interview: Financial Freedom and More362 Are You Spiritual?Justifying Parental Authority Without OwnershipA Critique of Nozicks Comments on Parental Obligations and Childrens Rights348 Breaking Free349 Free-Range Kids Reviewed By a Former Free-Range Kid
tvlpodcast |

The Theory Of Acquired Rights Violates Hoppe's Specificity Principle

SHARE TO X SHARE TO REDDIT SHARE TO FACEBOOK WALLPAPER