Uploaded March 2025 | Updated September 2026, 2 weeks ago
About the Seminar:
Despite everything, liberalism remains the one true political philosophy. Liberal principles – something about liberty and autonomy, something about equality, perhaps some universalist and rationalist assumptions – are still the right fundamental principles for political philosophy.
But this doesn’t mean – nor did you think – that there are no more troubles for liberalism. The most dominant version of liberalism (in English-speaking political philosophy) over the past half century is weak and confused, philosophically and politically. We should do better. And there are many other problems – new and old – to face.
The liberalism that we need to defend (not just theoretically) is robust and self-confident intellectually, but very realistic and careful politically. It is in no way skeptical or relativistic, but it is pragmatically flexible. It is philosophically uncompromising, but politically willing to compromise about pretty much everything.
This paper is a broad-brush-stroke presentation and defense of this shameless kind of liberalism.
About the Speaker:
David studied law and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, then clerked for Justice Beinisch at the Israeli Supreme Court. He pursued a PhD in philosophy at NYU (2003), and has been a faculty member at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem ever since, on a joint appointment in philosophy and law. He started at Oxford as the Professor of the Philosophy of Law in 2023.
David published work in metaethics (where he defends a robust, non-naturalistic kind of moral realism), in the philosophy of law (where he criticizes some versions of "general jurisprudence", discusses moral and legal luck, and analyses the role of statistical evidence), in political philosophy (where he criticizes Rawlsian, public-reason liberalism, discusses false consciousness, and nudging), in ethics (where he discusses the status of hypothetical consent, and rejects the existence of moral luck), and more.
About the Seminar:
Despite everything, liberalism remains the one true political philosophy. Liberal principles – something about liberty and autonomy, something about equality, perhaps some universalist and rationalist assumptions – are still the right fundamental principles for political philosophy.
But this doesn’t mean – nor did you think – that there are no more troubles for liberalism. The most dominant version of liberalism (in English-speaking political philosophy) over the past half century is weak and confused, philosophically and politically. We should do better. And there are many other problems – new and old – to face.
The liberalism that we need to defend (not just theoretically) is robust and self-confident intellectually, but very realistic and careful politically. It is in no way skeptical or relativistic, but it is pragmatically flexible. It is philosophically uncompromising, but politically willing to compromise about pretty much everything.
This paper is a broad-brush-stroke presentation and defense of this shameless kind of liberalism.
About the Speaker:
David studied law and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, then clerked for Justice Beinisch at the Israeli Supreme Court. He pursued a PhD in philosophy at NYU (2003), and has been a faculty member at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem ever since, on a joint appointment in philosophy and law. He started at Oxford as the Professor of the Philosophy of Law in 2023.
David published work in metaethics (where he defends a robust, non-naturalistic kind of moral realism), in the philosophy of law (where he criticizes some versions of "general jurisprudence", discusses moral and legal luck, and analyses the role of statistical evidence), in political philosophy (where he criticizes Rawlsian, public-reason liberalism, discusses false consciousness, and nudging), in ethics (where he discusses the status of hypothetical consent, and rejects the existence of moral luck), and more.
