Russia-Ukraine War and Air Power Theory @CISACatStanford
Russia-Ukraine War and Air Power Theory  @CISACatStanford
Uploaded November 2023 | Updated September 2026, 37 minutes ago
Speaker: Jaganath Sankaran
In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, American intelligence had concluded the impending Russian efforts would succeed. A Department of Defense official reportedly noted that the collapse of Ukraine “might take a few days longer” than the Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was expected to lead the Russian military assault, eliminating Ukraine’s air defense and paving the way for Russian troops to capture Kyiv. However, in hindsight, the expectations were inflated and misinformed. What explains the failure of VKS to acquire and hold air dominance over a much weaker Ukrainian Air Force? I explore three causal factors to understand the failures of the VKS—Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness, Russian culture and its impact on the doctrine and role of VKS in Russian national security, and the role of information and intelligence integration in airpower projection.
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Russia-Ukraine War and Air Power Theory

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