Uploaded June 2025 | Updated November 2026, 4 days ago
THE ANNUAL MATRASZEK LECTURE:
‘BOETHIUS AND THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON’
JONATHAN PRICE, Matraszek Fellow, Pusey House & Pusey Fellow, St Cross.
You are a person, I am a person, but what is a person? (and why does it matter?) Fourteen-hundred years ago Boethius said ‘person’ is the ‘individual substance of a rational nature / rationalis naturae individua substantia’. Boethius’ Aristotelian conception of the person was then re-affirmed by St Thomas Aquinas in the high middle ages, and thereby carried through into the modern age as a necessary part of Latin Trinitarian theology. For us, ‘person’ still means ‘an individual rational being’. But it also implies much more, such as the dignity and the relationality and --lately but most importantly -- the unicity, of such a creature. This lecture will ask how native are these scholastic and modern developments to the Boethian definition of ‘person’, and whether the Boethian definition is still fit for purpose.
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Pusey House is an institution associated with the University of Oxford founded as a memorial to Edward Bouverie Pusey, a leading figure of the Oxford Movement - a movement of the mid-19th century which sought to bring the Church of England to a deeper understanding of its witness as part of the Universal Catholic Church.
The House continues the work of E. B. Pusey in restoring the Church of England's Catholic life and witness.
THE ANNUAL MATRASZEK LECTURE:
‘BOETHIUS AND THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON’
JONATHAN PRICE, Matraszek Fellow, Pusey House & Pusey Fellow, St Cross.
You are a person, I am a person, but what is a person? (and why does it matter?) Fourteen-hundred years ago Boethius said ‘person’ is the ‘individual substance of a rational nature / rationalis naturae individua substantia’. Boethius’ Aristotelian conception of the person was then re-affirmed by St Thomas Aquinas in the high middle ages, and thereby carried through into the modern age as a necessary part of Latin Trinitarian theology. For us, ‘person’ still means ‘an individual rational being’. But it also implies much more, such as the dignity and the relationality and --lately but most importantly -- the unicity, of such a creature. This lecture will ask how native are these scholastic and modern developments to the Boethian definition of ‘person’, and whether the Boethian definition is still fit for purpose.
Donate & Support: puseyhouse.enthuse.com/donate
Become a Friend of Pusey House: puseyhouse.enthuse.com/page3e4b7#!
Website: puseyhouse.org.uk
Instagram: instagram.com/puseyhouse
Twitter: twitter.com/PuseyHouse
Facebook: facebook.com/puseyhouseoxford
Pusey House is an institution associated with the University of Oxford founded as a memorial to Edward Bouverie Pusey, a leading figure of the Oxford Movement - a movement of the mid-19th century which sought to bring the Church of England to a deeper understanding of its witness as part of the Universal Catholic Church.
The House continues the work of E. B. Pusey in restoring the Church of England's Catholic life and witness.










