Uploaded October 2026 | Updated November 2026, 10 hours ago
In a global marketplace moving billions of shipments a year, how much can the United States really do to keep weapons components out of its adversaries' hands?
In this episode of The High Top, Kate Koren, deputy director of the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, joins Jon B. Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, to discuss the global supply chains behind Iran’s weapons and the limits of the tools Washington uses to disrupt them. Their conversation examines how cheap, decades-old commercial components end up inside Iranian drones and missiles, why China and Russia have done little to stop the flow, how the war is shaping the way the UAE and India approach trade with Iran and the United States, and what export controls and sanctions can realistically achieve.
Iran cannot make the integrated circuits that guide its weapons, but the basic chips, motors, and propellant chemicals it relies on are ubiquitous and move through a global trading system that handles nearly a billion shipping containers and 250 billion parcels a year. China and Russia both have export control systems built with U.S. support, yet neither has used them against these dual-use components, and Russia has used its seat in the Wassenaar Arrangement to block new controls. Export controls cannot fully stop the flow of such parts, but they can raise costs, cause delays, and slow Iran’s ability to replenish what it fires, making the effort less a battle to be won than a constant fight, much like the war on drugs. At the same time, countries like India are hedging among partners rather than choosing sides, raising the question of how hard Washington can lean on secondary sanctions without building habits of resistance instead of habits of cooperation.
To understand what it takes to keep weapons components out of Iran’s hands, tune in to Jon and Kate’s full conversation.
0:00 — What's inside Iran's drones?
2:26 — Can anyone police global trade?
3:27 — Are China and Russia helping?
6:27 — How is the war changing the UAE and India?
7:51 — Will new sanctions push India away?
10:00 — Do export controls work?
12:04 — Where have export controls succeeded?
13:40 — Secondary or multilateral sanctions?
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Visit csis.org to find more of our work as we bring bipartisan solutions to the world's greatest challenges.
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In a global marketplace moving billions of shipments a year, how much can the United States really do to keep weapons components out of its adversaries' hands?
In this episode of The High Top, Kate Koren, deputy director of the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS, joins Jon B. Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, to discuss the global supply chains behind Iran’s weapons and the limits of the tools Washington uses to disrupt them. Their conversation examines how cheap, decades-old commercial components end up inside Iranian drones and missiles, why China and Russia have done little to stop the flow, how the war is shaping the way the UAE and India approach trade with Iran and the United States, and what export controls and sanctions can realistically achieve.
Iran cannot make the integrated circuits that guide its weapons, but the basic chips, motors, and propellant chemicals it relies on are ubiquitous and move through a global trading system that handles nearly a billion shipping containers and 250 billion parcels a year. China and Russia both have export control systems built with U.S. support, yet neither has used them against these dual-use components, and Russia has used its seat in the Wassenaar Arrangement to block new controls. Export controls cannot fully stop the flow of such parts, but they can raise costs, cause delays, and slow Iran’s ability to replenish what it fires, making the effort less a battle to be won than a constant fight, much like the war on drugs. At the same time, countries like India are hedging among partners rather than choosing sides, raising the question of how hard Washington can lean on secondary sanctions without building habits of resistance instead of habits of cooperation.
To understand what it takes to keep weapons components out of Iran’s hands, tune in to Jon and Kate’s full conversation.
0:00 — What's inside Iran's drones?
2:26 — Can anyone police global trade?
3:27 — Are China and Russia helping?
6:27 — How is the war changing the UAE and India?
7:51 — Will new sanctions push India away?
10:00 — Do export controls work?
12:04 — Where have export controls succeeded?
13:40 — Secondary or multilateral sanctions?
---------------------------------------------
A nonpartisan institution, CSIS is the top national security think tank in the world.
Visit csis.org to find more of our work as we bring bipartisan solutions to the world's greatest challenges.
Want to see more videos and virtual events? Subscribe to this channel and turn on notifications: https://cs.is/2dCfTve
Follow CSIS on:
• Twitter: twitter.com/csis
• Facebook: facebook.com/CSIS.org
• Instagram: instagram.com/csis






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